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Abstract

Many organizations are finding it advantageous and often necessary to form
collaborative alliances with strategic partners in order to solve collective problems and
jointly work towards mutually desirable ends. This research examines a single case study
of inter-agency coordination between the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and their involvement in humanitarian
relief efforts. Pursuit of advancement through two collaboration models provided the
framework of the research and contributed to the analysis of data. Resulting outcomes
offer incentives for both organizations to develop stronger social networks assisting in a
deeper understanding of the others organizational cultures and as well as urges
operational collaboration across institutional lines.
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A STUDY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
CONDUCT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

I. Introduction

Background
Relatively all consumable items used by the branches of the U.S. military are provided by
the Defense Logistics Agency, DLA. DLA either purchases or sources everything the
Department of Defense (DoD) needs to operate, to include food, fuel, medical supplies,
uniforms, construction and barrier equipment, vehicles, and tents. Additionally, DLA provides
over 86 percent of the military’s spare parts for various transportation platforms, aircraft, and
weapon systems (DLA Small Business, 2017). When perceived as being able to offer a unique
capability in a humanitarian response effort, DLA can utilize their various depot locations, their
capacity for expedient transportation, resources that are otherwise scarce or indented for specific
purposes, or their contingency planning abilities to the benefit of those helping the victims of a
natural disaster or complex emergency.
One of the divisions of DLA responsible for leading engagements in Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts is known as the Whole of Government (WOG)
Support Division. Their mission focuses on engaging in/with: Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA), Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), International Logistics and Security
Assistance (IL/SA), various federal agencies, and associated state and local municipalities, to
build partnerships, improve support, and gather information, enabling them to achieve desired
customer outcomes (DLA J31 Roles and Missions, 2017).
1

In 2014, the director of DLA, Vice Admiral Mark Harnitchek, issued a Directive-Type
Memorandum that made it DLA policy to establish agreements with Combatant Commands
(CCMDs), military services, and Other Government Agencies (OGAs), in support of foreign
humanitarian assistance activities (DLA, 2014). This policy states that DLA is obligated to
shorten response times and, when authorized, send their most qualified personnel forward to
integrate with strategic partners (DLA, 2014). Leveraging their resources to fill initial gaps in
CCMD’s or an OGA’s ability to respond to crises is a capability DLA wants to afford to their
partners and customers. Their numerous competences merged with their overarching emphasis to
act with a sense of urgency in an effort to save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the impact of
disasters, create a lot to offer other members of the humanitarian logistics enterprise (DLA,
2014).
When DLA’s capacities and capabilities are called upon to provide humanitarian aid,
they are always in support of U.S. federal agencies which are leading the response effort on
behalf of the U.S Government. Many of these relationships are with various federal agencies
within the U.S. Department of State, (DoS). One partner that is independent of the DoS, but is
an official component of U.S. foreign policy, is the U.S. Agency for International Development,
or USAID. Their mission is focused on putting an end to extreme poverty and advancing the
development of democratic societies that can sustain broad-based economic growth, respect and
promote human rights, and strive to advance freedom, human dignity and development (USAID,
2017). The specific division within USAID responsible for managing humanitarian relief efforts
for the U.S. Government overseas is called the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, or
OFDA. They have five regional offices, over 20 field offices, approximately 430 staff members,
along with OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors at six U.S. Air Force major commands.
2

Their mission focus mandates that they utilize their capabilities to save lives, alleviate human
suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters worldwide (USAID, 2014).
Their employees are comprised of regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell teams and
exchange liaison officers, to name a few. With stockpiles of supplies and commodities located in
Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Subang, Malaysia, they are
prepared to respond to the average 70 HA/DR operations each year (USAID, 2014). Perhaps the
initial thought when one hears the term “natural disaster” is the destruction that is caused by
natural forces such as earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis. And while these types of disasters
can be extremely devastating, USAID/OFDA is kept extremely active by additional disasters,
with both a slow and rapid onset; such as influenza pandemics, famine, and refugee crises. All of
these response operations come with a different set of requirements, civil objectives, political
sensitivities, and methods to best meet the needs of affected victims.
When a disaster strikes a foreign country, there are several steps that must take place
before it is determined necessary for the U.S. to get involved. The affected countries’ Chief of
Mission authority officially declares a disaster when first, the local government and official
responders are overwhelmed in their response efforts and effective assistance to its citizens
cannot be accomplished organically. Second, the affected country must be willing to accept U.S.
assistance as it is crucial that the U.S. does not impose its aid on another country, but rather, is
welcomed and openly received.
Lastly, it must be in the best interest of the U.S. to conduct humanitarian relief in that
country, in other words, there must be a political will to respond, and there are also versatile
diplomatic and political sensitivities that are considered so as not to produce any negative second
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or third order effects for either party. Once these criteria are met, and only then, would the U.S.
Government respond to a foreign disaster.
Thus, out of these response efforts, rarer cases arise where DoS calls upon the DoD or
DLA due to one or several unique capabilities they offer. To assist in providing a perspective on
the frequency with which DoD or DLA becomes involved in foreign HA/DR efforts, consider
that in one calendar year there are approximately 600 to 700 disasters that occur worldwide. Out
of those 600 to 700 disasters, USAID/OFDA responds to approximately 10 percent as only 60 to
70 events rise to the level of the official disaster declaration and U.S. response criteria.
Furthermore, out of the approximate 60 to 70 disasters where OFDA responds in some capacity,
it is only about 10 percent of those where DoD or DLA is called upon to support OFDA’s
HA/DR efforts. Therefore, it’s reasonable to suggest that neither the DoD nor DLA is inundated
with multiple OFDA requests for support in HA/DR operations. However, a key point to
consider is that despite the small percentage of operations where DLA and OFDA work together
in HA/DR missions, when disasters of such magnitude strike, they tend to be highly scrutinized
and immense in scope, severity, and impact.
One example of their joint efforts took place in 2014 during the mass Ebola outbreak in
West Africa. USAID led the overall U.S. response effort and deployed Disaster Assistance
Response Teams (DARTs) to Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Mali to coordinate the
interagency actions, assess the situation, and identify gaps in response efforts. The DARTs were
comprised of approximately 15 members from various U.S. Government agencies, including
USAID/OFDA, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the DoD, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, and the U.S. Forest Service (USAID, 2017). USAID also partnered closely
with the United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP) and supported its work to build a system
4

of warehouses throughout the country and develop a supply chain of medical equipment to
ensure Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) received ample resources to open their doors and sustain
operations (USAID, 2017). With this supply chain in place, Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE), and other medical supplies could now be transported by truck to logistics bases located in
five strategic Liberian cities. Africa Command (AFRICOM) called upon DLA to assist with
efforts in Liberia and through coordination with the U.S. Army, U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), AFRICOM, U.S. Army Core of Engineers, and USAID, they had established
three separate warehouses to deliver all classes of supply, except ammunition.
They also initiated the deployment of expeditionary teams to pre-position these materials,
which helped establish 17 ETUs (Busch, 2016). DLA’s support effort in West Africa lasted
several months, and per expectations, they transitioned operations to local authorities, federal
agencies, and NGOs in early 2017. Today, USAID, among other agencies like the World Health
Organization (WHO), are continuing to conduct critical training for health care workers in the
effected countries which will help contain future outbreaks and instill the importance of health
education.

General Issue
Saving lives and alleviating suffering brought on by all types of natural disasters and
complex situations is too large and important of a responsibility for any single organization to
undertake alone. Therefore, the relationships formed with partners who are willing to help
shoulder that responsibility are pivotal to uphold and to continuously improve upon. With one of
USAID/OFDA’s partners being DLA, cultivating better interagency coordination between each
agency is considered a challenging, yet important goal to achieve.
5

Research Focus
Through examination of each agency’s internal governing mechanisms, HA/DR
execution procedures, and potential collaboration barriers, this research seeks to evaluate DLA’s
collaboration with USAID/OFDA in the conduct of HA/DR.

Research Objective
Using two collaboration models as the main framework, the primary research question to
be addressed is:
RQ: How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID/OFDA so that it
improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?

Investigative Questions
Once a common language is established by providing several definitions regarding the
overarching collaboration model, a better understanding of how to address subsequent
investigative questions can be acquired. The research question can be addressed by collectively
answering the following investigative questions:

IQ1: How can the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and DLA (in conducting HA/DR
operations) be characterized?
IQ2: What are the current initiatives for USAID/OFDA and DLA to pursue progress from
cooperation to coordination to collaboration?
IQ3: What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?
6

IQ4: What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those collaborative
barriers?
IQ5: How can DLA work with USAID/OFDA in order to formulate broad-based requirements to
ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before disasters occur?

The second chapter of the study will discuss some of the literature involved in each of the
constructs that comprise the collaboration model. Chapter three will describe the methodology
used to conduct the study with chapter four detailing the results and analysis of the data collected
from both USAID/OFDA and DLA. Finally, chapter five will conclude with implications and
recommendations for improving the DLA-USAID/OFDA relationship in the future.

7

II. Literature Review

Definition of Disaster
Humanitarian relief operations involve various logistic complexities many of which are
different for each operation. The unfortunate circumstances or disasters that drive the need for
humanitarian operations are also different and are defined diversely by various organizations.
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) is the term that will be used to refer to the
response operations that DLA and USAID, among other organizations, conduct in order to save
lives and alleviate suffering of victims.
One organization known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) defines a disaster as, “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the
functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or
environmental losses that exceed the communities’ or societies’ ability to cope using its own
resources” (IFRC, 2009a). The IFRC goes on to make note of the fact that although many
disasters are caused by natural forces and encompass events such as earthquakes, tsunamis,
tornadoes, and hurricanes, disasters can also include events that have human origins.
Unfortunately, these types of events are intentional and include things such as terrorist attacks
and acts of war, which encompass chemical, biological, and nuclear assaults (IFRC, 2009a).
Unintentional, man-made disasters are another type of disaster, and can occur as a result of
human error: transportation catastrophes, oil spills, structural collapses of buildings, or controlled
fires becoming unconstrained, are a few examples.
Additional categories of disasters, which are highlighted by the Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT), incorporate slow-onset disasters as well, such as famine, drought, or
8

growing pollution concentrations (WHO & CRED, 2010). They help their audience to
understand the difference in impact that different disasters have on the affected communities.
Using an earthquake as an example of a sudden disaster, they explain that an earthquake has an
immediate, direct impact on its victims, with little to no warning signs, and health responses
must also be immediate. Once the earthquake has passed, usually the indirect health effects must
be attended to for approximately one to two weeks. Thus, for these types of disasters, the
demand for external response efforts is high at the onset and then decreases fairly quickly after
the disaster is over.
Contrarily, with a drought or famine, which is a slow-onset disaster, the demand for
assistance can begin years before it is at its most severe state, and last even longer after the worst
has passed. For these slow-onset disasters, there are usually clear and early warning signs, which
should activate prevention and preparedness measures to be taken. However, these disasters still
occur all over the globe and the health effects from their impact take much longer to recover
from (WHO, 1999).
As one can imagine, most of these various types of disasters require different levels of
responses and resources from outside agencies. Each type of disaster inflicts varying degrees of
devastation and the uncertainty surrounding this devastation makes it difficult to prepare for the
sudden disasters in particular. The logistic feats that many times have to take place in order to
successfully alleviate suffering and save lives, are made extremely more difficult when
destruction of infrastructure and loss of communication with the affected population occurs.
On behalf of the U.S. Government, USAID/OFDA is the main agency responsible for
leading and managing all foreign disaster response efforts. As the primary manager of HA/DR
operations, it is important to comprehend their definition of a disaster as it could potentially
9

initiate other agencies’ involvement. USAID’s Building Alliances Series on Emergencies,
published in June 2009, states:

Natural disasters are the consequences of a natural hazard and can affect populations in
the forms of floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, volcanic eruptions, droughts, and
famine. Additionally, disasters can be directly or indirectly caused by humans and can
include events such as chemical spills, wild fires, crashes, and pandemics. (USAID,
2009)

They also explain that complex emergencies are other instances where they may become
involved in organizing a response effort, as their definition of complex emergencies is
summarized to include populations threatened by acts of war, civil turmoil, international strife,
terrorist exploits, and industrial catastrophes. These types of complex emergencies are often
long-term situations that impact the livelihoods of surrounding populations in a devastating
manner (USAID, 2009). Needless to say, USAID is an incredibly busy organization. If they are
not actively responding to a natural disaster, they are proactively responding to other vulnerable
communities around the globe in attempt to inform them on prevention and preparedness
measures. Along with USAID/OFDA’s relief commodity stockpiles and 430 staff members
worldwide, they normally combine their resources and have relationships with both U.S. federal
agencies and many Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in order to carry out large HA/DR
operations.
One agency they have relied upon in the past and will hopefully continue to seek
assistance from is DLA. Due to the fact that they are a support agency during HA/DR operations,
DLA can fill any gaps in the initial logistic channels and utilize their robust network to purchase
10

or source items not available through normal acquisition processes (Ryder, 2017). When needed,
DLA can coordinate with TRANSCOM, the appropriate COCOM, and several others to help
establish a supply chain in order to get commodities from origin to destination, in addition,
sometimes the vendors with whom they establish contracts offer direct delivery to the area in
need. With several of USAID’s core competencies in leading HA/DR operations, conducting
assessments of needs, coordinating lines of communication, and gaining country access, they are
a highly adept organization. And coupled with DLA’s capacity to supplement with targeted
logistic capabilities, access to various forms of transportation, area-specific reconnaissance,
aerial imagery, and a large number of responsive personnel, it is essential that each agency
realize the other’s competencies to draw on, should they be needed in the future. As a result, the
ultimate beneficiaries from DLA and USAID further synchronizing their HA/DR response
efforts, would be disaster-affected victims. But putting this idea into action, however wellintentioned, introduces the concept of interagency coordination which can be particularly
challenging.

Interagency Coordination
As a broad notion, interagency coordination has been studied by many sociologists,
behavioral scientists, business managers, and political administrations, to name a few. One of
the most foundational studies concentrates on the formation of collaborative alliances and
establishes a more systematic understanding of the theories behind why they occur (Gray &
Wood, 1991). Gray and Wood explain that a collaborative alliance occurs when organizations
collectively attempt to resolve issues and problems that are too difficult and convoluted to be
solved by only one organization alone. Additionally, two agencies that have related core
11

competencies and a similar objective can become a force multiplier if they collaborate. The term
collaboration is defined by Gray as, “a process through which parties who see different aspects
of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond
their own limited vision of what is possible.” (Gray, 1989). With collaboration referring to the
process, and collaborative alliances referring to the forms, many organizations are finding it
advantageous and often necessary to find partners with whom to work toward mutually desirable
ends. The authors go on to say that the configuration of organizations are typically linked to a
particular problem set and that each organization is faced with the added pressure of resource
scarcity (Gray & Wood, 1991).
Another study conducted by Max Stephenson Jr., Co-Director for the Institute for
Governance and Accountabilities at Virginia Tech University, explains certain factors that may
facilitate or inhibit operational coordination between humanitarian agencies. One of these
factors relates to organization’s internal operating structures, as they do not always encourage
broad cross-talk or open cooperation among their internal sections, much less another external
organization (Stephenson Jr, 2005). Reflecting back to DLA and USAID, this could definitely
be an area worth navigating as DLA’s internal structure and language closely resembles that
within the U.S. Department of Defense and USAID/OFDA’s structure and common language is
rather independent and judicial in nature. Stephenson proposes that increased cooperation
among humanitarian relief organizations operating in a given emergency setting be achieved by
means of inter-organizational consensus building (Stephenson Jr, 2005). More specifically, these
organizations might be encouraged to build individual cultures and finally, if possible, a shared
culture of what has been dubbed ‘collective sense making’, (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), which
may serve to ensure at least a method of operational cooperation across successive cases of
12

engagement (Stephenson Jr, 2005). But the capacity of two or more agencies to reach
comprehensive sense making demands a degree of trust among its participants (Stephenson Jr,
2005).
It is this concept of trust that is a foundational building block upon which the structure of
interagency coordination is built. While there are various interpretations of the characteristics of
trust, Zaheer et al., (1998) offer their own three-part definition, “Trust is the expectation that an
actor can (1) be relied on to fulfill obligations, (2) will behave in a predictable manner, and (3)
will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present.” (Zaheer, McEvily,
& Perrone, 1998). It is also important to realize that individual participants must first be
disposed to trust and thereafter, actually be willing to extend trust to another across
organizational boundaries (Stephenson Jr, 2005).
The body of literature on interagency coordination was augmented by scholarly work on
how the widespread use of information technology can change the ways people work together
(Malone & Crowston, 1994). A brief definition of coordination is given as managing various
dependencies amid activities (Malone & Crowston, 1994). They also stress the importance of
interagency coordination due to the fact that in businesses today, global interdependencies are
becoming more critical in order to adapt to an accelerating pace, a pace that ultimately crosses a
threshold of new ways to organize successful human activities (Malone & Crowston, 1994). An
emphasis is also placed on how communication is being conducted between agencies,
particularly information exchange within producer-consumer relationships. By making this
information actually ‘usable’ to both parties, they can establish a common language and develop
standards for communication, which could then be designed into computer networks and other
cooperative-work tools (Lee & Malone, 1990). Furthermore, a computer system in place that
13

already “speaks the language” of the users, is more likely to take root and actually aid in
communication instead of hindering it.

Historical Interaction Between USAID and DLA
While the vast amount of research conducted on interagency coordination could be
explored almost indefinitely, a shift in focus back to DLA and USAID is suitable for the purpose
of examining past HA/DR operations that have contributed to the formation of their relationship.
While each interaction between two agencies contributes in different ways, it’s important to
understand the history of that interaction in order to constructively influence future operations.
As one of their first, joint efforts, USAID, DLA, the DoD, and many other organizations
played an active role in coordinating one of the largest response efforts in HA/DR history for
Operation Unified Response (OUR). On January 12th, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck
the capital of Haiti, about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, devastating the country with an
estimated 230,000 deaths and 194,000 injured (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). In less than
24 hours USAID/OFDA dispatched their DART team consisting of 17 members to Port-auPrince and immediately activated their Response Management Team (RMT) in Washington D.C.
for their support. The DART assessed humanitarian needs and coordinated assistance with the
U.S. Embassy in Port-au- Prince, the international community, the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH), the U.S. DoD, and the Government of Haiti (GoH) (USAID, 2010).
Within two days of the disaster, the headquarters for Joint Task Force Haiti, JTF-Haiti,
was established by U.S. Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) to begin conducting
humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal
agency, USAID (Institute, 2015). From the onset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked
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alongside counterparts from USAID, MINUSTAH, and several NGOs. Together, they developed
plans for protecting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in makeshift shelters who were at great
risk of further disaster due to impending flooding and additional structural collapses (Institute,
2015). The locations for 16 food distributions sites throughout Port-au-Prince were mapped out,
requirements determined, and concepts of operations written. These critical sites were then
rapidly established and supported and more than two million Haitians received much needed
food and water on a regular basis (Institute, 2015).
DLA’s role began when they partnered with SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, and JTF-Haiti
to provide post-earthquake humanitarian assistance. DLA provided food, water, medical
supplies, and construction equipment to the relief effort and they also deployed a support team to
JTF-Haiti. The DLA team assisted JTF-Haiti in field activities working around the clock to meet
customer’s needs (DLA, 2010). The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti brought together
tremendous capacity and willingness to help from hundreds of organizations (DLA, 2010).
Various relief efforts continued well past the completion of OUR and one of the largest lessons
stressed was the importance of building unity of effort among all participating organizations
(Institute, 2015).
Although OUR was one of the first, major operations that USAID, DLA, and many other
agencies jointly worked, the specific partnership between USAID/OFDA and DLA didn’t take
root at that time. Several years later however, the main, formative interaction contributing to the
relationship between both agencies began with the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort in 2015.
The unfortunate circumstances leading up to the cause of this event began in March 2011, with
pro-democracy demonstrations in Syria against President Bashar al-Assad. They were fueled in
the southern city of Deraa after the arrest and torture of several teenagers who painted
15

revolutionary slogans on a school wall. The anti-government protests were initially peaceful,
however violence quickly escalated after the Syrian government opened-fire on protestors, and
armed opposition groups began fighting back. Over the next several years, the country
descended into civil war as rebel brigades were formed to battle government forces for control of
cities, towns and the countryside. By June 2013, the UN stated that 90,000 people had been
killed in the conflict and by August 2015, that figure had climbed to 250,000 (Rodgers et al.,
2016). As the attacks and civil turmoil intensified in Syria, The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) reported over 4.7 million Syrian refugees attempting to
escape to safety in neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (Grimley,
2015). With extremely long distances to travel on foot coupled with the harsh winter
temperatures, many were struggling to survive the journey.
USAID/OFDA, the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) office,
USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, multiple NGOs, the Government of Iraq, and others in the
international humanitarian community, began responding with supplies needed for survival.
Several camps were established to provide temporary shelters and vast amounts of food and
water were being transported to those seeking refuge from violence. However, as the mass
exodus from Syria continued, more and more refugees were left vulnerable and it continued to
strain the resources of the surrounding regions, furthermore, many were still exposed to
declining temperatures.
Therefore, in August 2015, the DoS submitted a letter requesting humanitarian support in
the form of Non-Food Items (NFIs) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in response
to IDPs in Iraq. Another letter was sent from the DoS to OSD on 14 September, 2015 requesting
NFI humanitarian support for the refugees currently in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. This began
16

the massive coordination effort that launched several agencies into action; DLA began working
with USAID, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, DoS PRM, and many different vendors in attempt to
meet the requirements for the NFIs requested.
Through extensive conversations with the beneficiaries and the UN Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), very specific characteristics of the commodities requested needed to be fulfilled in
order to meet the cultural requirements of IDPs. Several types of commodities required were
blankets, mattresses, towels, carpets, pillows, hygiene kits, and winter clothing. But it was
imperative that the product specifications per item were met accurately, as any linkages or ability
to trace its origins to the U.S. or U.S. military, (whether by product number, color, brandings,
etc.) could cause the IDPs to be targeted by rebel forces and armed militant actors. Thus,
adherence to the humanitarian principle of doing no harm to the benefactors was of prime
importance.
One of the various unique aspects surrounding the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief efforts,
was the mandate for DLA to use expiring Fiscal Year funds called Overseas Humanitarian
Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. This meant that over $114.6 million had
to be expended/obligated by 30 September, which significantly shortened DLA’s response time.
Due to the mandate of using OHDACA funds, which is DoD money, USAID/OFDA was
assigned to use DLA, which also came with the caveat of having to communicate all actions
through CENTCOM; this made the process more complex, as it included more participants in
decision making. When DLA received an itemized listing with the commodity requirements,
USAID/OFDA had already identified approved vendors to provide some of the commodities but
there were legislative barriers preventing DLA to contract with non-U.S. vendors, at least right
away. The Berry Amendment is one that mandates DLA give procurement priority of certain
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commodities to American made/manufactured materials, however, if appropriate justification
can be made affirming that the types of material or commodity cannot be domestically sourced,
then DLA can attempt to get a Domestic Non-Availability Determination (D-NAD) waiver
signed. But this process can take absorbent amounts of time, which was a luxury DLA did not
have. Another issue was the amount of money allocated was completely accounted for in the
procurement of the items, however, funding for transportation of the commodities, distribution
center set-up, labor costs, and customs/clearance taxation costs were not anticipated. The
compounding variables of DLA having to procure non-standard items, from non-standard
vendors, and deliver them via a non-standard delivery method, forced them to communicate with
USAID/OFDA frequently and thoroughly to accomplish their objectives. Needless to say, the
amount of challenging and procedural ‘pain’ that was endured by many parties involved created
a sizeable and steep learning curve throughout the operation.
Both DLA and USAID/OFDA learned a great deal about the other’s roles, limitations,
capabilities, and organizational cultural differences. Despite the countless trials, compressed
timeline, and funding restraints, the Syrian/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort was deemed a success
and ended with the final commodity delivery in March of 2016. In the end, over 3 million items
were sourced from 50 different vendors and shipped to 10 different locations spread over 4
countries. This operation also impacted millions of lives.
While several other examples of DLA working with USAID/OFDA, among other
agencies exist, there have not been any previous studies conducted that look exclusively at
USAID/OFDA and DLA. There is always a broader stage with multiple actors who are also
involved in HA/DR coordination efforts. Although multiple actors are required to fill essential
roles for HA/DR operations, this study focuses on coordination between DLA and USAID.
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Furthermore, out of the vast amount of studies that have been conducted on general interagency
coordination as a concept, as well as between real agencies, none have been found that look
solely at DLA and USAID/OFDA. But before analyzing the relationship between DLA and
USAID/OFDA, a common understanding of the ways in which two agencies can operate in
conjunction with one another must first be considered.

Frameworks
Two collaboration models contribute to establishing this understanding and also provide
the framework through which their organizational relationship can be evaluated. This study will
use both of these frameworks.
The first, depicted in Figure 1, comes from a collective study conducted by several
researchers who stipulate three activities which take place in order to achieve a successful
operation by two or more agencies.

Build Trust

Collaborative
Behaviors

Generate
Value

Successful
Operation

Figure 2 - Collaboration Model (adapted from Saab et al. 2009)

Deemed a “collaboration model” by the researchers, the first of the fundamental actions is to
Build Trust among agency members. According to the study, trust is established through two
mechanisms: face-to-face meetings and collaborative projects (Saab, Tapia, Maitland, &
Maldonado, 2009). Sharing information about oneself, one’s organization, and one’s social
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network and resources is the first step in creating trust (Saab et al., 2009). The second activity
consists of Collaborative Behaviors. Through interviews of members responsible for conducting
field level HA/DR activities, the authors concluded that these members believed collective action
would result in better collaboration on future projects as well as facilitate stronger relationships
between members. Achieving consensus with respect to developing, funding, and implementing
relevant projects employed collaborative behaviors. Saab et al. explained that the perceived
benefits of collaborating on influential action items helped members to recognize the value in
working together to achieve common goals. This introduces the third activity of Generating
Value. When individuals are able to connect with others from a different agency, this can lead to
the enhancement of skill sets. Individuals from each agency who take on the responsibility of
mentoring one another according to their strengths recognize meaningful worth and value in
doing so.
All three of these activities are connected in that collaboration serves to reinforce trust if
the individuals involved in a particular project are able to derive some value from it. Saab et al.
concluded that if the collaborative activities and behaviors are seen as having value, and are also
seen as reinforcing trust among individuals, the operation is considered to be a success from an
interagency perspective. Success is the fourth and final stage of the collaboration model.
The second framework can be viewed as a subset of the second activity, Collaborative
Behaviors, indicated in the first model. Created by several of the same authors, this model first
establishes three separate definitions of the terms cooperation, coordination, and collaboration,
which are terms that will be utilized in assessing DLA’s and USAID’s relationship. The
distinction of these terms is important as they reflect differing levels of commitment each agency
has towards working together.
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Cooperation between organizations usually manifests as a primarily verbal dialogue and
takes place in informal settings. An organization can present a need that another organization
could satisfy without a formal contract or agreement (Hord, 1986). Hence, there are no risks or
loss of independence with this kind of interaction (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).
Coordination takes place when organizations find that their individual goals are similar,
so they work together on separate, yet compatible missions (Czajkowski, 2007). There are more
risks associated with coordinated activities because organizations commit resources and the
result of their efforts may be beneficial for only one of the parties (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).
Collaboration takes place when organizations share authority and responsibility for
planning and implementing an action to solve a problem. Stakeholders, “engage in an
interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures to act or decide on issues related
to that domain” (Gray & Wood, 1991).
The flow of the second model begins with two headquarter agencies, each managing their
respective field-level offices. As the model shows progression from cooperation to coordination,
then finally to collaboration, there are arrows pointing to different domains in which each
headquarter/field-level office can reside. This model is particularly applicable as both DLA and
USAID/OFDA manage regional and/or field-level offices and each have a separate headquarters
location. The core concept of this model is describing the soft boundaries between cooperation,
coordination, and collaboration, indicating that two organizations can transfer back and forth
along this continuum. Moreover, it makes the distinction between the last two levels with
collaboration as working together on a specific task while cooperation is working on independent
tasks toward a common goal (Hvinden, 1994).
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Both frameworks provide the primary tools needed to determine where each agency
currently is on this continuum. Additionally, the frameworks help to determine the extent to
which both agencies can collaborate if indeed possible. The activities and concepts explained in
both models, when applied, are significant in that they have the potential to influence the
strategic, tactical, and operational goals of both DLA’s and USAID’s HA/DR operations (Saab et
al., 2009). Having thus presented the frameworks as a premise, determination of the
methodology behind the research will be the next topic discussed in this study.
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III. Methodology

Case Study Approach
This research was conducted as a single case study on the relationship between DLA and
USAID/OFDA. A case study approach is a suitable method to examine the co-operation of both
agencies as it can improve discernment about a misunderstood or unfamiliar situation (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2013). Additionally, the results derived from the case study can be used to intentionally
modify each agency’s perception of the other, along with their interactions and communication
methods. Using a case study method to address the research question is merited as it seeks to
explain how two agencies can work in cohesion with one another towards a common end. Case
studies are useful in determining how or why a phenomenon occurs (Yin, 2014). Whatever the
topic domain or field of interest, the distinctive need for case study research arises out of the
desire to understand complex social circumstances (Yin, 2014).
One of the first tasks necessary to begin any case study is to understand the dynamics
present within the setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, understanding the dynamics currently at
work within each agency was paramount. And although many case studies employ multiple
levels of analysis; i.e.: a firm’s executive, mid-level, or field-level divisions, this study examined
DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s interactions at the headquarters level (Eisenhardt, 1989). This way,
depending on research results, any new levels of understanding, interaction alterations, or
regulation modifications can be made at the top and ideally extend down to field or operational
levels.
DLA and USAID/OFDA were the two agencies chosen for this study because the
positive impact that would result from a stronger ability to interact, trust, and execute their
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intertwined responsibilities, could be immensely beneficial to disaster victims. Furthermore,
DLA has recently established a new division entitled the Whole of Government Support
Division, whose mission is to, “lead engagements…with federal agencies and associated state
and local municipality customers, to build partnerships which improve support, to gather
information for agency planning, and to focus efforts on achieving desired customer outcomes.”
(DLA J31 Roles and Missions, 2017). This new division provides opportune grounds for
building stronger relationships with USAID/OFDA personnel.

Data Sources and Methods
The two sources of data for this case study stemmed from semi-structured phone
interviews of both DLA and USAID/OFDA participants, as well as archival documents from
both agencies. In preparation for the data collection phase of the study, and in attempt to follow
several guidelines presented by Yin (2014), the researcher briefly conducted a self-assessment of
skills and abilities to maintain the following efforts:
•

Asking good questions – and interpreting the answers fairly

•

Being a good listener – and not trapped by existing ideologies or preconceptions

•

Staying adaptive – so that newly encountered situations are seen as opportunities, not
threats

•

Have a firm grasp of the issues being studied – even when in exploratory mode

•

Avoiding biases – by being sensitive to contrary evidence and conducting research
ethically (Yin, 2014).
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A main tool that assisted in these efforts, as well as increased the validity of the study,
was the construction and use of a case study protocol that can be found in Appendix A. This
provided the guidelines as necessary, especially during interviews, to maintain focus on
addressing the posed questions and hence the overarching research question. A reference to all
interview questions, approved by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Institutional
Review Board (IRB), is provided in Appendix C. The interview protocol contains one set of
questions for DLA personnel and another set of the same questions for USAID/OFDA personnel
with only minor terminology changes as they pertain to each agency being addressed.
The qualitative method of semi-structured interviews was chosen as a form of data
collection for several reasons with the foremost being that an interview is a professional
interaction that goes beyond a spontaneous conversation, but rather, if performed correctly, can
be a construction site for acquiring thoroughly tested knowledge (Kvale, 2007). The qualitative
interview is a key venue for exploring ways in which the interviewee experiences and
understands their environment. It provides a unique access to the lived world of the subjects,
who in their own words describe their activities, experiences, and opinions (Kvale, 2007).
Thirteen interviews in total were conducted with 10 of the interviewees being from DLA
and three from USAID/OFDA. Three of the DLA participants hold leadership roles in the WOG
Division and are responsible for building partnerships and improving support to over 40 federal
agencies. They work with Foreign Disaster Relief, Foreign Military Sales, and Defense Support
Civil Authorities as well to cultivate support policy and process mechanisms. Other DLA
interviewees held leadership roles in the Operations Division, who are responsible for
coordinating and integrating DLA’s logistic capabilities with Combatant Commands, the Joint
Staff, and other defense agencies. This section also manages the Joint Logistics Operations
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Center (JLOC), which helps link and synchronize DLA support functions as well as Command
and Control functions during contingency operations. All DLA personnel were able to provide
unique and valuable insight into the agency’s culture as well as portray their inclination to work
with USAID/OFDA. Regarding the interview participants from USAID/OFDA, two participants
reside in OFDA’s Operations Division, which house the Military Liaison Teams. These teams
are the principal point of contact for OFDA to coordinate with the DoD on Foreign Disaster
Response and humanitarian assistance operations. They are also responsible for conducting the
JHOC training at their headquarters location as well as around the globe. The last of the USAID
participants worked in OFDA’s Humanitarian Policy and Global Engagement (HPGE) division.
This division is responsible for tracking trends and policy developments in humanitarian
assistance efforts, as well as managing global programs, policy and outreach, strategic
communication, and interagency training and engagements. The following table is provided to
indicate the number and length of each interview performed:

Table – 1 Interviews
Agency
DLA Interview 1

Length
(Hr : Min)
1:09

DLA Interview 2

1:03

DLA Interview 3

0:34

DLA Interview 4

0:57

DLA Interview 5

1:27

DLA Interview 6

1:12
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DLA Interview 7

0:46

DLA Interview 8

1:19

DLA Interview 9

0:41

DLA Interview 10

1:02

USAID/OFDA Interview 1

1:18

USAID/OFDA Interview 2

1:10

USAID/OFDA Interview 3

0:56

Despite the heavy-sided DLA perspectives, achievement of a response saturation level
with USAID/OFDA interview participants similar to that of DLA’s interview participants was
attained. The term saturation indicates that after several interviews, the researcher gets to a
point where the participants begin to respond with the same type of replies, and similar answers
were given repeatedly.
The second type of data collected came from archival documents. As previously
mentioned, it is extremely important to establish a firm understanding of how both agencies are
currently conducting their HA/DR efforts and the regulatory processes binding each agencies’
actions. The archival documents containing this type of information provided much needed
insight, as well as assisted in grasping the differences and/or similarities in each agency’s
organizational cultures. They also provided a sense of acceptable conduct, social
practices/norms, and internal and external motives among each agency’s members. The
combination of interviews and archival documents certainly contributed to gathering a holistic
account of the real-world settings for each agency, and allowed for triangulation of data sources
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(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). Yin outlines several factors that facilitate triangulation including
the collection of numerous viewpoints, detecting multiple elements pertaining to situations, and
formulating the overall picture that surfaces as the analysis progresses. As it applies to this case
study, the 13 interviews contributed 13 different viewpoints, and each provided various elements
about their relationship that affected multiple HA/DR operations. Furthermore, both types of
data provided the opportunity to align my understanding under the participant’s outlook on their
own relationships with DLA and USAID/OFDA respectively. In attempt to follow Creswell’s
instruction for qualitative research, significant effort was also made to sincerely grasp the
meaning that the interviewees placed on particular problems or struggles, while intentionally
leaving out my own interpretation of those same problems or struggles. The researcher
intentionally adopted the mindset of each agencies’ participant throughout the data collection
process. Acknowledgment and consideration of biases while filtering through each data file was
also conducted. This greatly assisted in maintaining objectivity toward each member.

Data Analysis Process
Once all interview responses were recorded and archival documents initially collected,
the data analysis phase of research began. Creswell offers a six-step process that guides the
qualitative researcher in conducting a thorough data analysis, and this process was implemented
upon completion of data collection. The first step is to prepare and organize the raw data, which
includes the transcribing of all interview responses as well as sorting and arranging all notes
taken during the interviews (Creswell, 2014). Gathering all archival documents and arranging
them according to the applicable agency was also performed.
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The second step is to read through all the data and see what patterns, ideas, general tones,
and themes emerge through this initial exploration phase. This can be considered an
examination of data which can help answer questions such as, “What general ideas are the
participants conveying?” or “What is the impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of
the information?” (Creswell, pg. 197, 2014).
As progress was made through this second step, multiple themes emerged from the
transcriptions and archival documents to include cultural differences and attempts to acquire
information from USAID/OFDA. As a second, more deliberate pass was made through all data,
the researcher transitioned into the third step of the analysis process of coding. For this study,
five provisional codes were used initially (Miles et al., 2014) and pulled from the two framework
models discussed in the previous chapter. These codes are examples which Creswell defines as
expected codes, or codes that the reader would suspect to be found in a particular case study.
The provisional codes are Trust Building, Generating Value, Cooperation, Coordination, and
Collaboration.
As coding each portion of data under its proper concept continued, the researcher came
across segments of data that did not exactly fit into the pre-determined constructs. Thus, by
maintaining an open mindset and attempting to be sensitive to the fact that certain segments of
data may indicate a potential new theme has emerged and should be further investigated or
analyzed, several new codes were defined and incorporated into the entire data analysis process.
Some of these new codes can be categorized as unanticipated codes and one actually falls under
the category of an in-vivo code, which means it carries a term or phrase that was coined by the
participant, using his or her language (Creswell, 2014). With one of the unanticipated codes
being; DLA Giving USAID/OFDA the Credit, this was unexpected in that one would not
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automatically assume an agency such as DLA, which can be comprised of a lot of type-A
personalities, retired military, and active duty military, would acknowledge that they may not
always be the best choice for support. For example, one DLA representative stated:

USAID knows whatever country that’s been affected by the disaster. They are the experts
on site, we are there to support them, and we recognize that. They also source almost
everything locally, so they have insight into which vendors are best to establish contracts
with.

The code categorized as an in-vivo code is; DLA Trying to Get USAID/OFDA’s Playbook, with
the word ‘playbook’ being termed by DLA personnel. For example, the researcher frequently
came across statements such as:

In a perfect world, I would already have that playbook, that list of all the items,
quantities, colors, dimensions, etc., and vendors for every single thing they could possibly
want, whether or not it’s on contract. And whether or not they ever execute and spend
one penny on us, that’s fine, but at least we’re a lead time closer to supporting and
saving lives.

The request for such a playbook was even found in one of the After Action Report items
as a lesson learned, and was termed, “Request a Humanitarian Assistance Standard Operating
Procedure Playbook that can serve as a single reference document baselining common planning
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and execution procedures.” Therefore, due to the frequency and prevalent viewpoints on this
playbook, various data segments were framed with this in-vivo code.
The fourth step is to use all of the now coded data to explain and describe the setting of
the analysis. According to Creswell, the descriptions encompass information on the people
involved, background on the locations, and explanation of the conditions in the applicable
environment. Doing this can provide overarching and comprehensive themes that can serve as
headers when discussing the findings of the data analysis process (Creswell, 2014).
Step five encompasses using the method of triangulation with the data to build coherent
justification for the themes. As certain data sources or participant’s responses converged or
supported other perspectives, those connections were documented in analytic memos. As the
process of triangulation continued, experiences from each interviewee began to align with others
who had similar experiences, or justifications for a particular business practice. In some
instances, one agency’s business practice was found to be the stem of the other agency’s
frustrations. There were many causal connections made throughout the triangulation phase of
data analysis. Triangulation not only added to the validity of the study, but also assisted in
conveying the descriptive themes that emerged, that were not originally derived from the two
frameworks, allowing the researcher to fully comprehend the accurate outlooks held by each
participant from each agency (Creswell, 2014).
The sixth and final step involves interpreting the findings of the data analysis and
deriving a conclusion from the results. Discussion of findings is provided in the following
chapter by addressing each investigative question. Each question may warrant discussion
between both agencies on how to incorporate any positive practices moving forward. As
Creswell mentions, in qualitative research, where frameworks or models are used as a lens
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through which the data analysis takes place, the researcher can form conclusions that call for
action agendas towards progressive reform and change (Creswell, 2014). This research is
concluded with applicable recommendations to each agency on how to progress toward a more
collaborative relationship.
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IV. Analysis and Results

Results of Coding Analysis
Once all data was collected, transcribed, organized, and reviewed at the surface level, the
first deductive examinations began. The application used for data organization and coding was
the Dedoose Data Management software system, where dimensions of qualitative themes are
generated, explored, and integrated with other types of data. The Dedoose software served as a
platform that allowed for meticulous interpretation of each data type, whether they were archival
documents, interview transcripts, or notes taken throughout the study. As previously mentioned,
the researcher initially intended on using the following five provisional codes acquired from both
collaboration models: Building Trust, Generating Value, Cooperation, Coordination, and
Collaboration. These five provisional codes however, did not completely encompass the intent
and perspectives expressed in interviews and archival documents. Therefore, following the
initial deductive analysis of data, and remaining receptive to new codes arising, a more thorough
and inductive review of the data took place.
As analysis progressed, repetitious behaviors and circumstances were developing in each
data segment which ultimately manifested as ten additional codes. These new codes were:
Cultural Differences; DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value; DLA
Attempts to Acquire USAID’s “Playbook”; the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); Legislative
Barriers; Funding Limitations; DLA Giving USAID Credit; USAID Attempts to Improve C3,
Build Trust, and Generate Value; USAID Restricting Amount of Information Shared; and
USAID Managing Funds. Each code was defined by the behaviors or characteristics continually
exuded in the data. For detailed definitions of each code, please reference Appendix A.
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Moreover, as the coding process was conducted, the researcher was simultaneously
interpreting pieces of data with the creation of memos that the Dedoose software enables its
users to create. These memos assisted in capturing the essence of statements, responses to
situations, images, attitudes, as well as their accompanying implications. Memos were utilized
to capture anything that was indicative of DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s relationship, whether
positive or negative, or anything that offered an explanation as to why things are done a certain
way at both agencies. Maintaining the perspective of the subjects and intent of the archival
documents was of paramount importance and a continuous endeavor throughout the analysis.
Upon completion of the coding process, the analysis tool within the Dedoose software
was utilized to expose patterns and build visualizations of the code applications. The findings not
only indicated the frequencies with which all codes were used per data input, but they also
revealed different aspects of the complex relationships between certain codes. The first table
compiled as a result of the analysis is titled, Table - 2 Code Application.
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Table - 2 Code Application
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This table serves as a visualization of the frequency with which a particular code applied
to each data file. The number in each cell indicates the number of times that particular code was
used while coding that specific data file. Several findings were significant upon analysis of the
table, with the first being the totals located at the bottom of the table, particularly the ones in a
bold, thick border.
One can see that the two highest code counts are Cultural Differences with 54 instances
of application throughout the whole data set, along with Generating Value as the second highest
with 39 instances of application. This result certainly correlated with the responses received
from the majority of interviewees who agreed that the business practices, the expectations, the
social norms, and principles that guide each agency are vastly different from each other and have
been different for the history of both agencies’ operation. This translates into immeasurable
differences which manifest into two separate ways of thinking, two separate ways of approaching
problems, and two different organizational cultures.
However, attention can also be drawn to the application of Generating Value, at 39
counts. Instances of data segments that were categorized as such expressed the views of one
agency seeing value in the other. One example being that both DLA and USAID/OFDA see
value in the training opportunities each agency offers the other. Each see worth in the
investment of time and resources into cross-training that allows others to understand how they
‘do business’ and why they approach things the way they do. It has the potential to open new
lines of communication as well as help agency members see the strengths and core competencies
that the other agency has to offer. Another finding was that the least-used code, Cooperation,
only amounted to a total of four applications. One way this result can be interpreted is that the
agencies do not spend much time at the cooperation level, but this will be discussed further in
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Investigative Question One’s analysis. The last pattern that the Code Application table exposes
is the commonality in responses from USAID personnel reflected in Table – 3 Code Application
USAID Only, indicated below:

Table – 3 Code Application USAID Only

After examining a cut-out from Table 2 – Code Application of only the USAID
interviewee data files, one can see the similar pattern across the rows which indicate parallel
coding applications for their responses. A number of implications can be drawn from all three
USAID members answering the majority of the interview questions similarly, one of them being
that USAID’s training of their members is standardized and thorough. An alternate inference
could be that USAID personnel recall similar events and experiences which shape their views
and allow them to see through the ‘same lens’, providing for similar responses. DLA’s
responses also illustrate analogous results in code application but perhaps DLA’s experiences
differ across a more diverse audience, as the interviewees from DLA were from several different
departments. Again, part of the reason why the pattern is intriguing is that multiple conclusions
can be inferred from it.
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The next table produced after analysis is called the Code Co-occurrence Table, labeled as
Table -4 Code Co-occurrence:

Table – 4 Code Co-occurrence
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As one can see above, the table indicates how many times a pair of codes was utilized to
capture various data segments. Many of the scenarios described by both USAID and DLA
personnel, whether it entailed a past HA/DR operation, a training event, or an AAR meeting, had
two or more codes that applied to each example. The strongest correlation between codes was
found between Generating Value and Building Trust, indicated by two of the red boxes on Table3 Code Co-occurrence each containing the number 18 inside. This means that it counted 18
instances where these two codes occurred together and collectively described those particular
data segments. One example where this pair of codes applies is the discussion of DLA
orchestrating a tour of one of their warehouses to be given to several members of USAID. An
exploration of one of the warehouses run by DLA Troop Support in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
which houses several classes of supply, will help in generating value in the capabilities that DLA
could offer USAID/OFDA, should they be needed. It also gives the opportunity for
USAID/OFDA to trust in DLA’s capacities as a future contributor and establish the habitual
linkages with suppliers of core requirements for HA/DR operations.
Investigative Questions Answered
As the analysis portion of the study intends to address all Investigative Questions,
subsequently answering the main Research Question, the Collaboration model construct and the
findings within all tables will assist in answering IQ1:

IQ1: How can the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and DLA (in conducting
HA/DR operations) be characterized?
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Referring back to the Collaboration model discussed in the literature review, there is a
continuum that can help characterize and place DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s current relationship.
Recall that Saab, et al. (2009) describes the cooperation level as two agencies working on
independent tasks but toward a similar objective. The type of communication involved at this
level of a relationship can be considered brief and transactional in nature, without having to
invest in shared resources. The coordination level is one step further, where two agencies are
working on separate tasks, yet each agencies’ end state is more conjoined. It can be
characterized by behaviors such as collective planning, invested time and shared resources, and
consensus building. Lastly, the collaboration level is the synchronized end-state where each
agency is working on the same task to achieve the same objective. Usually preceded with
substantial investments of resources, sharing a collective authority, and synchronizing each
organization’s efforts, collaboration is that level many agencies strive to reach in their
relationships with their strategic partners.
With this construct in mind, and based on the findings quantified in Table – 1 Code
Application, the code counts for Cooperation applications throughout the data set amount to four.
This is the least applied code out of the 15 available. Referring to Table-3 Code Co-occurrence,
Cooperation was only used once in combination with Coordination and twice in combination
with Generating Value, for a total of three applications throughout the data set. These results
also align with the information shared throughout the data collection phase as most past
interactions that DLA and USAID/OFDA have shared, seem to skip the cooperation level and go
straight into the coordination level at the least. One example of this occurred during the
Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort; once CENTCOM released orders to DLA to begin
assistance in support of the IDPs in Iraq, DLA was coordinating materials and kits with USAID
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to ensure they met all the specific requirements. Although this initiated a steep learning curve
for both agencies, DLA immediately began working with USAID/OFDA personnel and did not
spend time in the cooperation level of interaction. In this instance however, the urgency of the
requirement coupled with the shortened timeline in which to execute the mission did not allow
for functioning at only the cooperation level. Nonetheless, considering the content of the
interview data, several historical examples, as well as both tables’ findings regarding code
application, one can make the case that the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and
DLA stands at the coordination level of the collaboration model.
Several examples supporting this inference begin with the coordination it takes between
the two agencies to hold joint conferences where DLA and USAID have the opportunity to
discuss important matters facing the humanitarian community. One USAID/OFDA
representative states, “With DLA, we sit together on the Whole of Government Council. DLA and
well as USAID/OFDA, meet quarterly to discuss things like logistic capabilities, challenges,
gaps, and opportunities within the logistics profession across the whole of government”.
Another instance in support of DLA and USAID/OFDA residing at the coordination
level, is that USAID/OFDA uses their MLTs to coordinate with the DoD and DLA in what they
call an interagency forum. This is another quarterly dialogue that occurs, that provides an open
forum to discuss disaster response and what has been done in the past, it also allows leadership to
share concerns, issues, and opportunities while sitting at one table. It facilitates the compilation
of AARs after disasters have been responded to, and documents better ways to move forward so
that mistakes are not repeated. Coordination, consensus building, invested time and resources
have also taken place in order for both agencies to have a nearly completed Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). The agreement will be a foothold in the movement from coordination to
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collaboration as long as it is adhered to by both agencies. Last but not least, there is yet another
initiative headed by USAID/OFDA to construct a data base that has compiled and inventoried all
of the commercial authorities, directives, executive memos, presidential memos, and any policies
that relate to conducting international humanitarian response efforts. Although this process is
still underway, USAID/OFDA mentioned that DLA will be called upon to assist in providing
many of their directives and policies to contribute to the database. Completing such a complex
endeavor as this will definitely call for coordination and time between both agencies, but upon its
launch, this data base can give all humanitarian organizations the means to become familiar with
one another’s legal boundaries, operational constructs, and offer some justification to their
execution methods.

IQ2: What are the current initiatives for USAID/OFDA and DLA to pursue progress from
cooperation to coordination to collaboration?

Incorporating the answer for IQ1, where during HA/DR operations, USAID/OFDA and
DLA seem to jump straight into the coordination level of interaction, that is not to say that they
never reside at the cooperation level. Within the first described Collaboration model, agencies
can move back and forth as in reality, relationships can fluctuate. Even though the count of
instances at that level only amounted to four, (and three on the Co-occurrence Table), there are
lull times where USAID/OFDA and DLA don’t work together at all. Recall that the frequency
where DLA or DoD are called upon by USAID to assist in HA/DR operations is not very often.
This is because a unique capability offered by DLA or DoD may not be in demand by
USAID/OFDA at these times. With this understanding embraced by both agencies, it’s
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reasonable to understand why they may only interact at a cooperation level especially when there
are no urgent HA/DR missions occurring.
Even though initiative to pursue progress from cooperation to coordination to
collaboration may be a lower priority at these slow times, when HA/DR operations strike, many
members from both agencies are quickly motivated to initiate progress towards collaboration in
order to achieve mission objectives more efficiently. Several initiatives exist for continual
progress on the Collaboration model regardless of the operations tempo, due to these inevitable
crises.
One of the main initiatives is to complete the MOA between DLA and USAID/OFDA.
This MOA has been a progressive effort that began as a result of the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian
Relief effort. It is currently still in a draft status, but once approved, it will serve as a mechanism
that captures the lessons learned and instills guidance that will ideally keep both agencies from
repeating historical mistakes. It will also help educate newcomers into the agencies on the
motives behind certain policies and business practices. As with any organization, when certain
leadership personnel decide to leave the agency or that particular department, whether it’s due to
retirement, different positions, or other job opportunities, they take all their experience with
them, and sometimes a gap in knowledge exists for periods of time before it is regained.
Therefore, the MOA not only helps to remind both agencies of good business practices,
but it helps DLA keep the mindset of USAID being the customer and DLA the supporting
agency. It will also outline new training initiatives, providing for more opportunities to
communicate and build trust with their counterparts. It is important to realize that the MOA is
not the ‘one-off’ solution to achieving a completely synchronized relationship between DLA and
OFDA. But once it is approved and signed, and both agencies adhere to it, and allow it to guide
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their interactions, it can shape the evolution of their inner workings and outward performance for
the better. The MOA is only the beginning, and a necessary step towards achieving each
agency’s goals.
Another initiative shared between DLA and USAID/OFDA is the motivation to achieve a
more mature, performance-based logistics relationship where trust and transparency are valued.
A justified question is ‘what does a performance-based logistic relationship look like, from a
practical standpoint?’ One viewpoint that DLA shared mentioned the various benefits of being
involved at the onset of disaster coordination meetings. When disasters strike, and USAID first
begins coordinating with its NGO partners, UN organizations, or DoS agencies, giving DLA a
seat at the table can help decision makers realize all benefits they can leverage to achieve their
collective aims. Even if DLA’s capacities are not ultimately utilized, being involved in the
planning discussions can keep them aware and allow them to be proactive should assistance from
them be requested. Being frontloaded with information and potential requirements positions
DLA in a much more preemptive stance versus waiting until the exact requirements are
completely fleshed out and DLA’s timeline to respond is almost unfeasibly shortened. The latter
actions do both agencies a disservice.
Another example shared by DLA illuminated facts about their operations that most
federal agencies don’t realize are at their disposal via DLA’s logistic enterprise. One element
regarding the materials stockpiled at their warehouses is that over 75 percent of DLA’s stock
numbers are commercial, off-the-shelf items. They are not ‘MILSPEC’ items with U.S. military
markings, brandings, or colors, but they have what one could find on the local U.S. economy.
Despite their wide range of materials stored, DLA recognizes that they may not always be the
most cost-effective choice for USAID/OFDA and their subsequent customers. Part of what
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USAID aims to achieve is to help support developing countries’ economies, and from their
strategic viewpoint, acquiring material from one developing country to assist another in need
after a disaster, would likely take precedence over giving that business opportunity to a U.S.
organization. Of course, this is very situationally dependent, but to have USAID/OFDA consider
all angles of assistance is one of the practical applications of a collaborative relationship.
Other initiatives that would assist in the stride from coordination to collaboration are the
training efforts and conference meetings that each agency holds for the other or attends in
conjunction with other humanitarian agencies. Courses that the Operations Division of
USAID/OFDA instructs, namely the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) is a great
tool that USAID/OFDA uses to educate other agencies on their mission, OFDA’s roles in
HA/DR responses, and how the Mission Tasking Matrix, or MITAM, process works.
Conversely, DLA hosts several training courses, one of which is called the Senior Leadership
Course, which helps to develop leaders within the agency as well as with DLA’s partners.
There is also a United Nations Civilian-Military Coordination conference that is held
annually in Geneva where multiple humanitarian organizations such as the WFP, USAID/OFDA,
DoS PRM, NGOs, and the DoD, among others, come together to discuss issues facing
international humanitarian communities, to learn how to better work with each other, and to
codify standards. As I came across data segments that mentioned these training efforts and
conferences, they served as prime examples where the co-occurrence of codes, Generating Value
and Building Trust, applies. Through these activities, USAID/OFDA and DLA learn how the
other is governed, why certain mechanisms are institutionalized, and what the other’s core
competencies are. This generates value that each agency sees in the other, as well as provides the
environment and opportunities to build trust and credibility with one another. Due to these
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secondary effects, the paired use of these codes assists in identifying the training efforts and joint
conferences as current initiatives that each agency should continue to pursue. The use of this
code-pair amounted to 18 applications which demonstrates the prevalence with which these
initiatives are occupying the mentalities of each agency’s members. Ultimately, sustained
pursuit of cross-training and joint conferences would provide USAID/OFDA and DLA the
knowledge on how best to leverage each other’s strengths and utilize their differences to the
other’s advantage.

IQ3: What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?

As each agency is well aware, there are numerable restrictions that prevent the smooth
and direct support of DLA to USAID/OFDA as well as the consideration USAID/OFDA can
give to DLA as a provider. Most of these barriers are in the form of legislation, statutes,
directives, executive orders, and regulations, which are often connected to different types of
funding authorities. Even with the acknowledgment that most laws and directives are enacted to
give agencies the authority needed to perform their missions, or provide them protection from
litigations, some of the primary governance is seen as an inhibitor to effective logistic or
contractual support. Not only do legislative barriers exist, but the bureaucratic processes that
accompany them can be extraordinarily labor-intensive as well.
One of the main directives that gives DLA the authority to contribute to humanitarian
operations at the request of the U.S. Government, is DoD Directive 5100.46 which is part of
DoD policy in accordance with Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) and Executive Order 12966. The
directive states that the DoD and DoD components shall respond to foreign disasters in support
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of USAID if the appropriate departmental or agency’s Executive Secretariat provides an official,
written request to the DoD Executive Secretary, and if providing requested assistance does not
negatively impact ongoing military operations or security cooperation objectives. While this
directive stemming from Title 10 USC, grants DLA a means to contribute to FDR operations,
there is another section within Title 10 USC that can sometimes be a large barrier for DLA in
providing expedient humanitarian assistance. The Berry Amendment was originally passed by
Congress in 1941 to promote the purchase of U.S. goods. The amendment was made permanent
in Public Law 103-139 and was later codified in Title 10 USC under section 2533a (Defense
Procurement and Aquisition Policy, 2014).
This law restricts any DoD funding from being used to buy food, clothing, tents,
tarpaulins, covers, cotton, woven silk or silk blend material, synthetic fabric, canvas products,
wool fibers or yarns, textile fibers, or any article of individual equipment or hand tools, from any
non-domestic source. Restrictions imposed by the Berry Amendment are far reaching, however,
there is an exception that has been built into it; there is a waiver process that can attempt to be
pursued in what is called a Domestic Non-Availability Determination, or DNAD. This waiver
may be granted if it is determined that the items requested cannot be grown, reprocessed, reused,
or produced in sufficient quantity, quality and timeliness, at U.S. market prices. The laborious
efforts which come into this waiver process begin with the determination aspect. In order for the
item(s) to be determined as not available, the procuring agency must conduct market research
and analysis of potential alternative sources. The list of specifications that the item(s) must meet
has to be provided and explained, in writing, and why an alternative material, or item would not
be accepted by the requiring agency. As part of the procurement agency’s market research, they
must publicly advertise a ‘sources sought notification’ and allow bidding contracts to be
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submitted by certain agencies if they claim to be capable of meeting all specified requirements
within the provided timelines.
The results of market research and analysis must be included in the package for DNAD
approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics serves as
the approval authority for DoD agencies, but it will only reach that level after going through
DLA’s internal approval processes. Needless to say, acquiring the DNAD waiver to the Berry
Amendment can take extensive amounts of time and with urgent situations such as HA/DR
support, time is a commodity that should not be wasted. It is another reason that DLA shared
their desire for receiving the requirements early, even if they are not fully known or have yet to
be validated. In situations where DLA knows they are going to be receiving requirements from
USAID/OFDA, they don’t want to wait to begin material research and vendor coordination until
the Executive Secretary Memorandum is approved, as research and coordination with vendors
are activities that can be done ahead of time without actually expending funds. This way, once
the defined requirements are validated and passed to DLA, DLA may already be positioned to
just execute with purchasing and delivery.
As far as legislation concerning USAID, the establishment of the agency began with the
passing of the Foreign Assistance Act, enacted on September 4th, 1961. The Act reorganized the
structure of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, separated military from non-military aid,
and created a new agency, USAID, to administer those non-military, economic assistance
programs. Since its establishment however, USAID has implemented many other legislative
principles. Two examples are the Oslo Guidelines drafted in 1994, as well as the Foreign
Military and Civil Defense Assets Guidelines, or MCDA Guidelines, written in 2003. These
guidelines explain that in certain complex situations, any foreign military assistance, whether or
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not provided by parties to an on-going military operation, could be perceived as being associated
with military operations. And in order to preserve the neutrality, impartiality, and independence
of humanitarian action, all realistic civilian alternatives must be explored first, and the principle
of complementarity upheld before using foreign militaries to support humanitarian operations
(OHCA-CMCS, 2011).
They go on to mention that priority should always be given to the use of civilian assets in
responding to humanitarian needs, and they seek to balance these principles by reverting to the
use of foreign MCDA as a ‘last resort’. They aim to limit the use of military assistance to a clear
supporting and temporary role, with a focus on infrastructure support and indirect support, rather
than direct, assistance to those in need (OHCA-CMCS, 2011). Throughout the data collection
phase of this study, there was a perceived understanding of these principles, as many DLA
personnel realized the potentially dangerous second and third order effects that could arise from
defense personnel being seen directly assisting those in the disaster-stricken areas.
Understanding the political sensitivities that can be unique to every country is paramount
and even though a majority of DLA employees embrace this knowledge, educating all of the
DoD is still an ongoing process. A process that most times has to be taught and re-taught when
USAID/OFDA is mandated to go through one of the CCMDs for humanitarian assistance. Of
course, this mandate only applies when OHDACA funds are used, and since they are
congressionally appropriated, they are highly scrutinized, and it makes the use of them much
more bureaucratically complex. Evidence in support of the difficulty that the multitude of
legislation and funding authorities produce for each agency is found throughout the data and was
coded accordingly. Referring back to Table - 4 Code Co-occurrence, the second highest
application of pair-codes was Legislative Barriers – Funding Limitations, with 12 counts
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throughout the data. Although a notional perspective, one could conclude that a reason as to why
each agency operates within immeasurably different cultures, is partially due to the legislative
and funding limitations that have governed each agency from the beginning of their
establishments.
This presents the one of the main barriers to collaboration, which primarily stems from
deeply rooted cultural differences. The way in which both agencies approach HA/DR operations
and basic problem-solving techniques are fundamentally different. USAID’s experience in
working with the DoD has shaped their approach and mentality of DLA. As an example,
USAID/OFDA believes that the way the military conducts contingency planning, is once a
mission from OFDA has come to them, they will examine all the gathered information and
conceive of what all the worst-case scenarios could be. The military will formulate multiple
Courses of Operations (COAs) and commanders or leading personnel will desire to bring all
sorts of capabilities that could possibly be needed to the AOR. USAID/OFDA has frequently
encountered commanders who want to push various capabilities, people, resources, materials
when the majority of the time, they are not needed. The DoD may have brought special
forces/combat troops, but all USAID/OFDA needs is a few personnel to help install a waterpurification system, or commanders will want to have their C-130 aircraft perform air drop
missions delivering containers of supplies, but people in the area only need a bulldozer to help
clear a road. For instance, one USAID/OFDA representative states:

“Commanders love to use all the capabilities they have, so when a Joint Task Force
shows up for disaster response and the only thing we need from them is a couple of UH60s, they go, ‘Well, we’ve got these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, we’ve got these engineer
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teams, we’ve got these K-9 units, you name it, we’ve got it’ Then we say, ‘You know, all
that stuff really is not needed, let’s please not use it’. And that becomes difficult to get
across sometimes. So we work with commanders to try and help them see that there
other, better ways to do things.”

USAID has come to understand that military commanders yearn to use every capability at their
disposal and the Military Liaison Teams in OFDA spend a lot of time ‘turning off’ ideas that are
simply overkill. They still see the DoD as a large entity wanting to come into the affected area,
establish command and control, leave a large footprint, and have this overwhelming presence
that the military believes to be suitable. Many times, this way of thinking about the DoD as a
whole, has filtered over into having that same mentality about DLA.
However, much of DLA’s leadership, especially those in the WOG division, are more inline with the methods and approaches USAID/OFDA uses to get their missions accomplished.
They are aware of the humanitarian principles that declare military assets should always be
limited in time and scope during HA/DR operations, and that any plan for rendering support
needs to be accompanied by an intentional transition to civilian authorities as soon as
appropriately feasible. DLA is committed to setting up a more finely-tuned support mechanism
for USAID/OFDA to utilize when they see fit to do so.
Abiding by particular authorities and being restricted by certain legislative barriers for
such a long period of time, has most assuredly affected the way each agency handles situations.
Their respective outlooks on humanitarian response efforts are incredibly diverse, and this
diversity can often times be viewed as a large barrier to collaboration. The laws that govern each
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agency feed into their cultural differences and could claim a large justification as to why the
cultural differences are so deep.
While some of these regulations are binding and are out of each agencies’ administrative
control, there are almost always potential loop holes that, when justified, could help facilitate
more efficient support of HA/DR operations. Furthermore, as with any organization, educating
your customers as well as internal personnel, on how and why certain operating structures are
incorporated and practiced is a constant endeavor, if the organization is to be successful.

IQ4: What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those
collaborative barriers?

Most would argue that the main initiative for overcoming barriers to collaboration should
simply be to help those in need after a disaster or complex emergency strikes. With this
initiative indeed being at the foundation of collaboration, there are many practical applications
that can help in overcoming barriers to that end. The first initiative that each agency should
consider is conducting parallel strategic planning. Strategic planning performed jointly between
the two agencies is the key to effective USAID-DLA collaboration. This type of joint planning
would also foster a mutual understanding of USAID’s development objectives and
DoD’s/DLA’s military objectives, especially where they align and where they diverge (USAID,
2015). The DoD has certain lines of effort they are seeking to fulfill alongside various allied
countries throughout the globe and these lines of effort are normally encompassed in each
countries’ Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The TCPs are documents that each U.S. Embassy’s
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Office of Security Cooperation monitors and works toward accomplishing with the help of other
DoS, DoD, and local national authorities.
A similar document, in support of the DoS’s Integrated Country Strategy, is USAID’s
Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). USAID translates its policies and
priorities into plans through this process and works towards fulfilling the CDCS’s objectives. As
stated in USAID’s policy for working with the DoD, it’s important that the DoD work with
USAID/OFDA, as well as other divisions within USAID, to consult with and invite their inputs
when reviewing these strategic documents. Their policy also articulates that:

“USAID should be welcomed to provide inputs into DoD campaign planning efforts
through their Senior and Deputy Development Advisors and Humanitarian Assistance Advisors
located at the CCMDs. Furthermore, USAID will reciprocate by inviting DoD consultation on
CDCS development in the formulation of regional plans and strategies at appropriate levels”
(USAID, 2015).

Recognizing that a collaborative relationship needs continual maintenance, a periodic
review of these documents should be expected and performed by both agencies, along with all
others in the collective review process. Having this USAID–DoD Cooperation policy in place is
evidence that a written partnership exists, as the groundwork has been laid for the collaboration
to be given substance. But merely having a written policy, that is not put into practice does not
allow the relational ties between USAID and DoD to develop trust nor does it allow either
agency to reap the benefits of more accurate strategic planning. This concept applies to planning
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efforts conducted between USAID/OFDA and DLA in general since there are multiple policies,
initiatives, and contingency plans that could benefit from cross-talk amongst the two agencies.
Another initiative towards further collaboration was shared from the USAID/OFDA
perspective, and that is to further the education and training efforts between USAID and DLA.
Recall that one of the current initiatives in response to Investigative Question 2, is the current
training and education between the agencies. This encompasses the ongoing courses such as
JHOC and Senior Leader Courses. But there is another course USAID/OFDA would like to be
able to offer its internal personnel in the future regarding aviation support. This course would
help those team members in USAID that may potentially be leading DARTs, or formulating the
RMTs at their headquarters in Washington D.C., and many others who assist in logistics
coordination, by providing them the knowledge of the capabilities different types of DoD aircraft
could offer. Many times, when the DoD is called upon to assist in HA/DR, it’s because the
unique capacity they bring to the support effort is their speed and ability to move massive
amounts of cargo via airlift. Additionally, lessons on rotary wing support can also be extremely
useful and generate more value in the prospect of DoD capabilities being leveraged. Thus, a
tutorial on the range of aircraft, the unique abilities each type has, and the different
configurations of each aircraft, can greatly assist USAID by having them know what to ask for,
based on what they know will best meet the needs of each situation. A course such as ‘DoD
Airlift 101’ can help USAID become a better customer of DoD and DLA, which will greatly
assist in overcoming collaborative barriers to their relationship.
An additional lesson within such a course may also include the enormous benefit of
DoD’s analytic capabilities such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle imagery and geospatial mapping
proficiencies. This is yet another pivotal benefit that USAID can take advantage of, when and if
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it is needed. Since one of USAID’s goals is to develop a shared understanding of the common
operating environment and collectively conduct mission analysis, requesting this type of DoD
support can help USAID achieve that goal. Moreover, it is a goal that they have in common with
DLA when DLA is involved in support efforts. Historical data and aerial imagery could help
USAID conduct their assessments of countries/regions that they have restricted access to, help
identify where intermediate distribution centers should be located, pinpoint border crossings or
checkpoints, as well as assist in identifying any gaps in the overall operation.

IQ5: How can DLA work with USAID/OFDA in order to formulate broad-based
requirements to ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before
disasters occur?

A first step in the right direction of formulating broad based requirements is to know
what the other agency currently has in quantity, functionality, and location. During the data
collection phase, USAID/OFDA shared a forward-thinking perspective of working towards a
relationship where DLA and OFDA can share overall readiness levels, or capability postures, or
general readiness metrics that help one another understand the status of each other’s capacity to
respond at any given time. What would be needed first however, are the standards that the
agencies measure their readiness criteria against. Comprehending the basis of which capacities
each agency is evaluated on would allow both DLA and USAID/OFDA to speak a common
language and to conduct better planning efforts, ultimately leading to higher preparedness levels.
An example would be to indicate where current vendor contracts are in the approval
process and/or which ones are already established; these criteria may feed into an acquisition55

type of readiness level. Another point was made about initially establishing a measure of
readiness from the USAID/OFDA side, “Once you have criteria for measuring readiness, it has
to be evaluated on a regular basis, but it could be anything; your level of readiness is your
knowledge, and it is your accommodation of changes to be able and ready to execute”. The
challenges that come with this sharing of information is again, the explanation of what each
readiness metric means, as well as staying committed to evaluating and sharing the results
regularly.
This initiative can be hard to sustain by both agencies, but if each agency was
determined to pursue it, even on a biannual basis, it can lead to substantial benefits and cost
savings. Current examples of USAID/OFDA’s readiness information are warehouse stockpile
data, including weight, cubes, etc., established vendor contracts, and the number of personnel oncall to fulfill roles in operation centers should the need arise. Data segments that discussed these
readiness levels and the potential information that could comprise them were segregated through
the creation of memorandums within the Dedoose software. The memos allowed me to
document my line of thinking on significant statements such as sharing readiness criteria, and
how the agencies could benefit from them.
Enabling both agencies to check one another’s readiness levels to see if certain elements
would present any delays or indicate any temporarily diminished operations is central to efficient
resource utilization. An instance where sharing this type of information proved to be beneficial
occurred at Dover AFB, when their readiness posture was temporarily diminished due to their
primary runway being resurfaced. This impacted Fairfax County’s Search and Rescue’s ability
to deploy an urban search and rescue team for the east coast that was needed and working with
USAID/OFDA at the time. Gratefully, there was no negative impact, but it simply took a phone
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call from the base to USAID to notify them about Dover’s diminished operating level. This
concept can be applied for any number of instances, especially unforeseen ones that may require
a quicker response to navigate it successfully.
Circumstances such as construction operations that limit the number of employees that
can work, or appointing a whole new team of liaison officers within USAID/OFDA, or a newly
discovered problem/defect with a container that was just sourced and delivered, are all examples
of information that DLA and USAID/OFDA should be made aware of as they pertain to each
other’s missions. Various situations could be communicated via readiness level sharing that can
help each agency know which resources are located where, and how to better prepare for any
major HA/DR operations.
Another key point to establishing broad-based requirements between both agencies kept
emerging throughout the data collected from DLA. It resurfaced frequently enough that it
necessitated its own in-vivo code in order to accurately capture the views and appeals of
numerous DLA members. This was the concept of having enough trust built between the
agencies where each was willing to share the details of various playbooks with their appropriate
interagency counterparts. The phrase ‘playbooks’ refers to pre-canned, contingency
requirements that USAID/OFDA may have regarding potential crises, or long-standing
humanitarian efforts. Similar to this concept, the DoD and DLA have Operational Plans, which
although may not encompass the totality of efforts, resources, and capabilities, they still provide
an overall breakdown of the phases of response and duties of units involved. They mandate
keeping those particular base functions operating at healthy levels.
DLA strongly seeks to be positioned in a proactive posture by learning the playbooks of
USAID/OFDA, so that when future requirements do come to their agency, they waste no time in
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executing their fulfillment. The pre-scripted mission assignments for each play book would
allow pre-coordination with vendors, possibly even purchasing materials, and simply stocking
them at the best locations until they are needed from DLA or their vendors.
A practical example applies to the situation of the Mosul Dam in Baghdad, Iraq. If the
worst-case scenario were to happen and the dam fails, approximately 4 million Iraqi citizens and
12,000 to 15,000 U.S. citizens would be in harm’s way due to the flooding. The DoS has already
worked with USTRANSCOM to formulate an evacuation plan for U.S. citizens, embassy
employees, families, etc., but DLA is unsure of USAID’s response to assist Iraqi citizens. If
items such as plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, food, and water-purification systems, are the items
that USAID/OFDA would need, they could put a list together in the form of a Bill of Material, or
BOM, and DLA could begin work on at least identifying vendors that could support the specific
requirements. If a plan already exists that indicates USAID/OFDA would source everything
from alternate agencies besides DLA, then knowing that information would be beneficial as well.
Both DLA and USAID/OFDA should pursue a collaborative relationship where trust and
transparency are valued. If they get to this level, then perhaps USAID/OFDA may be more apt
to share their play books or equivalent efforts, and as long as DLA or DoD contributes
constructively and advances OFDA’s capabilities in the way they want them advanced, this
collective interaction would only generate more value in furthering their relationship.
As new, written agreements are established, proactive mindsets adopted, and more
interaction between the agencies occurs, new relational ties will be created. New motives to
further DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s mission objectives will encourage a new willingness to
work together. This motivation must be harnessed to ensure every effort is made to prevent the
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dwindling of collaborative efforts to only mere words, or good intentions; true collaboration
comes with the long-term investment of resources, people, and time.
In summation of all the responses provided for Investigative Questions one through five,
I would like to offer a collective response addressing the overall Research Question:

RQ: How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID so that it
improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?

DLA can engage in multifaceted activities such as continued pursuit of training efforts,
exercises, and quarterly meetings to share the knowledge of their missions and capabilities.
Furthermore, DLA should help share the realities (within the agency as well as with DoD) of
being politically and culturally sensitive to the people in need of support along with their
economic and social environment. Another step towards improving support is doing their part in
adhering to written policy so that ‘operational pain’ is not forgotten and repeated. This is
understandably a two-part effort as the other half of this responsibility should be undertaken by
USAID/OFDA, but regardless, it serves as a step toward strengthening credibility and
accountability with DLA’s strategic partners. Lastly, DLA should attempt to create
environments where constructive inputs are exchanged, transparency is valued, and habitual
relationships are institutionalized.

New Collaboration Model
Subsequently, this research provides the audience with an overall picture of where DLA
and USAID/OFDA reside in their inter-organizational relationship that can be viewed under a
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newly-constructed lens. Regarding the original Collaboration Model discussed in Chapter Two
and portrayed in the Figure 1 – Collaboration Model, by Saab et al., 2009, this study’s results did
not conform exactly to this framework, as there are several modifications as well as additions
resulting from this case study that contribute to a new models’ sequence:

Figure 2 – New Collaboration Model

First, one can see that Constructive Interaction is the initial triggering event that must
occur in order to give way to building trust with another organization. Constructive interaction is
represented well by the current initiatives between DLA and USAID/OFDA, any interaction that
is positive, educational, and constructive in nature contribute to the next step of Building Trust.
Once trust is established, each agency would begin to see value in maintaining the relationships
and would be supportive of continuing further interaction with one another. Generation of these
attitudes and establishing these preceding linkages would then give way to Collaborative
Behaviors, where each agency is operating in that performance-based logistics mentality,
synchronized efforts are in motion, and the habitual dependencies are being fulfilled and
strengthened.
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Once these collaborative behaviors are institutionalized, and it’s easier to reach this level
as an operative norm, successful HA/DR efforts are achieved, and mission objectives attained,
ultimately benefitting those in need of support. This completes the main steps in the New
Collaboration Model. However, note the dashed lines from each step going back to the
triggering event of Constructive Interaction, these dashed lines demonstrate the need to
oftentimes begin with additional interaction in order to progress to the next step in the sequence.
For example, before agencies can move from Generating Value to Collaborative Behaviors, they
may have to return to additional constructive interaction, which will subsequently build more
trust. The same movements can be made between steps represented by the shorter dashed arrows
between each step. It is not always a direct pathway to successful HA/DR operations, as many
back and forth movements will most likely be performed throughout the partnership’s
development, but this serves a positive reinforcement of all previous steps.
After analysis of all data and the coding results, the findings reveal that DLA and
USAID/OFDA are currently flowing through the sequence of Constructive Interaction – Build
Trust – Generate Value, and back and forth through the cycle as occasions rise. This is not to
say that the agencies have never reached the step of Collaborative Behaviors, but as far as
normal operations, they most often reside in a cycle of the first three steps. Progress will be
made to Collaborative Behaviors as long as each agency expresses their dedication to invest time
and resources into productive activities that enhance each agency’s skill sets and further their
common goals.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions of Research
Collaborative action in humanitarian response operations is a key challenge that many
organizations are facing both in the international domain and stateside domain. The presence of
multiple decision makers and multiple objectives often times add to the complexity of HA/DR
operations regarding logistics, finances, and capabilities. However, the research shows the
motivation that each agency has to overcome the multitude of collaborative barriers is enduring
and stronger than the challenges facing each organization.
At the onset of this case study research, the intent of offering a collective strategy to help
both agencies resolve collective problems began to seem almost impossible due to the deeplyrooted disparities and oppositions between DLA and USAID/OFDA. But after filtering through
each agency’s complaints, differences, and weaknesses, the ability to focus on the motives and
similar objectives assisted in winnowing down to the essence of collaborative alliances and how
they function. Each agency has the potential to enhance their preparedness for HA/DR
operations when they collectively focus on long-term development of themselves and one
another.

Recommendations for Action
DLA should consider three lines of effort in order to improve coordination with USAID
in the conduct of HA/DR: the first being a continued pursuit of the current and future initiatives
they have already introduced with USAID/OFDA, (initiatives such as the MOA, quarterly
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conferences/meetings, attendance at USAID/OFDA training courses, etc.) The second is to
ensure that all DLA personnel cultivate an environment where trust and transparency are valued
when working with USAID/OFDA. It’s imperative to maintain an open mind when building any
partnership, but even more so when collective gains can be achieved. And third is to assist
USAID/OFDA in any of their outreaches for further coordination whether it be sharing of
readiness level data or the legislation and directives to contribute to their data base compilation.
Learning more about their mission and organizational structure must be performed and then
shared among other DLA personnel. Reciprocally, USAID/OFDA should involve DLA in the
early stages of planning, even if they are only at the discussion/brainstorming levels, and at the
very least entertain the offers of DLA assistance in identifying support gaps.
As USAID/OFDA learns more about how DLA can contribute to HA/DR and all the
capabilities they bring, it is only a matter of time before a disaster strikes, and DLA will have to
prove their aptitude, and put many of these initiatives into action.

Managerial Implications
Current and future leaders in the humanitarian community need to be aware of the
concept of the Fog of Relief, as explained by an experienced leader in USAID/OFDA during the
data collection phase of this study. Similar to the concept of the Fog of War, the Fog of Relief
refers to that convoluted cross-section of various organizations participating in humanitarian
response efforts each having their own missions, capabilities, and modes of operating, etc. It
was explained as the gray intersection in the middle of multiple colored circles overlapping each
other, each representing a different organization. Managers in the humanitarian sector would do
well to not only comprehend their own organization’s roles and responsibilities, but also those of
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the participant organizations that will be operating in the same environment. Managers should
also recognize the collective gains that can come from collaborative alliances formed with
(similar and different) organizations. Once these alliances are created and sustained, each
agency can leverage the other’s core competencies and use their interdependencies to provide the
exact support needed by disaster victims. This simultaneously allows divestment of extra
responsibilities neither organization are suited to perform. Finally, managers should take the
time to familiarize themselves with various interagency collaborative studies, corporate
performance theories, analyses on strategic management among multiple agencies, and studies
that inform the leader on general inter-organizational dynamics.

Research Implications
As discussed in the previous chapter, the primary research implication this study offers is
the New Collaboration Model portrayed in Figure 2, not only as a more accurate indicator of the
specific DLA-USAID/OFDA relationship, but as a theoretical contribution to the topic of
interagency collaboration in general. With the dashed lines representing the back and forth
motion that an organizational relationship can undergo, this research implication represents the
realistic fluctuation experienced by many corporations and federal agencies today. Furthermore,
the addition of the Constructive Interaction Triggering Event is essential to initiate the Building
of Trust between agencies, and must occur sometimes repeatedly, before the next step can be
attained. As represented by the new model, inter-organizational collaboration is not always
achieved in a sequentially direct manner, thus, the dashed feedback loops represent the potential
for repetition beginning at one previous level or the very first Interaction level. This only serves
as reinforcement of each indicated step. Ultimately, this new model expresses a more in-depth
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procedure that emphasizes the indirect process that two or more agencies can undergo towards
accomplishing a successful HA/DR operation.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
Some may consider the fact that this case study only analyzed one pair of organizations
as a limiting factor to generalization. This was a single case study; however, justification resides
in the circumstance that each agency is in the midst of these collaborative obstacles in real time.
As a current situation facing both agencies, the specific research and recommendations pertain to
each agency accordingly and can be acted upon or shared with others presently. Furthermore,
the issues surrounding inter-organizational collaboration also currently affect multiple U.S.
federal agencies, who can glean some benefit or practical knowledge about DLA and
USAID/OFDA, both of which may be among their partners in the humanitarian community.
Another limitation affecting this research is the fact that only three interviews were able
to be conducted with USAID/OFDA individuals, while ten interviews were performed with DLA
personnel. This surely impacted the outcomes with being one-sided, and even contributed to
several biases about USAID/OFDA’s willingness to share information or collaborate with DLA.
However, as previously mentioned, despite the fact that only three interviews were conducted
with USAID/OFDA, a surprising level of saturation was achieved and the substance of their
primary messages negated many of the initial biases obtained from beginning of the data
collection phase. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that additional interviews with USAID/OFDA
personnel would have increased the validity of the findings.
Areas for future research include conducting a similar study but looking at several
organizations allowing for cross-case analyses. If time and resources permit, a comparison
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between multiple agencies will significantly add to the validity and generalization of the results,
having a broader impact on inter-organizational coordination as a whole. Future studies can also
take the approach of testing the New Collaboration Model, comparing it to the theory and
original model created by Saab et al. 2009, as well as making any relevant modifications thereby
generating an updated version of the Collaboration Model. The areas of future studies in such a
broad concept of collaboration between humanitarian organizations can be investigated
endlessly. However, as Gray and Wood (1991), express in their work on collaborative alliances,
future researchers should consider that there is no single theoretical or practical perspective that
provides an all-encompassing foundation for understanding the inner workings of collaborative
networks. Rather, grasping some semblance of comprehension comes from the collective study
of multiple collaboration strategies, theories, and observations of inter-organizational
relationships.

Summary
USAID/OFDA and DLA each desire to see the same objectives achieved, the main one
being alleviating the suffering of disaster victims in the most effective and efficient manner
possible. But culturally, they understand how to accomplish that objective differently. They
each have limitations, expectations, and challenges that they manage differently and often times,
separately. DLA and USAID/OFDA understand that each agency contributes very different
elements in order to achieve common goals, and each expresses a deep sense of ownership in
their missions. But what was most interesting is that most of the people comprising the
workforce of each agency are the same in certain aspects of character. Both DLA and
USAID/OFDA are motivated to do what they do out of a sacrificial offering of skills for the
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betterment of others. Both workforces are driven by the same things whether they be
contributing to the welfare and protection of the warfighter or providing the means for a
community to thrive economically and socially, each agency sincerely believes in their work and
each have a profound influence on their customers.
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Appendix A: DLA and USAID Case Study Protocol

Overview of the Case Study

1. DLA either purchases or sources everything the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to
operate, and due to their various depot locations, their capacity to store massive amounts of
material, and access to resources that are otherwise scarce, DLA is uniquely qualified to provide
humanitarian aid for disaster response efforts when called upon. The division of DLA
responsible for coordinating Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts is known
as the Whole of Government division, and they are a pivotal member of the humanitarian logistic
enterprise (DLA, 2014).

DLA has created various relationships with their customers and strategic partners, many of
which are with various federal agencies within the U.S. Department of State. In the realm of
HA/DR operations, the U.S. Agency for the International Development (USAID) is the lead
agency responsible for managing foreign relief efforts for the U.S. Government. The specific
division within USAID dedicated to international disaster response is called the Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance, or OFDA. Both the Whole of Government division within DLA and
OFDA within USAID, have previously worked together to accomplish HA/DR coordination
operations. With a look toward the future, one should consider that the relationship between
DLA and USAID be improved upon due to the occasional, yet inevitable disasters where DLA
may be called upon to render supplementary aid.
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Problem Statement
Saving lives and alleviating suffering brought on by all types of natural disasters and complex
situations is a large and important responsibility for any single organization to undertake.
Therefore, the relationships formed with partners who are willing to help shoulder that
responsibility are pivotal to uphold and to continuously develop. Leaders at the headquarters
level of both agencies could have a tremendous impact on cultivating better interagencycoordination between DLA and USAID in all aspects. Through examination of each agency’s
internal governing mechanisms, HA/DR execution procedures, and potential collaboration
barriers, this research seeks to help improve DLA’s collaboration with USAID in the conduct of
HA/DR.

Using two collaboration models as the main framework (Saab et al., 2009), the research will be
conducted as a single case study with semi-structured interviews and analysis of archival
documents as the main data sources.

2. The primary research question to be addressed is:
RQ: How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID so that it
improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?

Once a common language is established by providing several definitions regarding the
overarching collaboration model, a better understanding of how to address subsequent
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investigative questions can be acquired. The research question can be addressed by collectively
answering the following investigative questions:

IQ1: How can the current relationship between USAID and DLA (in conducting HA/DR
operations) be characterized?

IQ2: What are the current initiatives for USAID and DLA to pursue progress from
cooperation to coordination to collaboration?

IQ3: What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?

IQ4: What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those
collaborative barriers?

IQ5: How can DLA work with USAID in order to formulate broad-based requirements to
ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before disasters occur?

3. Archival documents and interview transcripts will be analyzed both inductively and
deductively. Any common themes that emerge will be evaluated against the pre-determined
constructs presented in the two collaboration models (see Saab et al., 2009). The current state of
interagency coordination between DLA and USAID is expected to be at the cooperation level,
with only transactional communication currently taking place between both agencies.
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Key readings are as follows:

Saab, D., Tapia, A., Maitland, C., & Maldonado, E. (2009). Inter-organizational
coordination in the wild: Trust building and collaboration among field-level ICT workers in
humanitarian relief organizations. : International Journal of …, 20(1), 194–213.

Hord, S. (1986). A synthesis of research on organizational collaboration. Educational
Leadership, 43(5), 22–26.

DLA. DLA Policy and Procedures, Pub. L. No. 14–028, DTM 14-028 1 (2014). Directive
Type Memorandum. Retrieved from
http://www.dla.mil/HQ/StrategicPlansandPolicy/Offers/Products/PolicyAndProcedures.asp

Gray, B., & Wood, D. J. (1991). Collaborative Alliances: Moving from Practice to Theory.
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(1), 3–22.

Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research Design and Methods. (G. Dickens, Ed.) (5th ed.).
SAGE Publications, Inc.

Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. Organization Science, 9(2),
141–159. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.9.2.141
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Stephenson Jr, M. (2005). Making humanitarian relief networks more effective: operational
coordination, trust and sense making. Disasters, 29(4), 337–350.

Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of
Management Review, 14(4), 532–550.

Data Collection Procedures

1. Researcher: Capt Jessica M. Thomas (ENS AFIT Master’s Student)

2. DLA POC: Mr. Chris Stephens (Deputy Chief of Whole of Government (WOG) Support
Division J3)

3. Data collection plan (See Appendix B for a complete list of archival documents and
interview questions)
•

The following types of archival documents and visual materials from DLA will be
collected for analysis: Directive Type Memorandums, (DTMs); guidance
documents; organizational flow charts; briefing slides; mission statements;
training material; and any documentation deemed important by the researcher
which is pursuant to the research topic.

•

The following types of archival documents and visual materials from USAID will
be collected for analysis: Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) training
material; USAID/OFDA Quick Reference Guide; HA/DR execution procedures;
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organizational flow charts; and any documentation deemed important by the
researcher which is pursuant to the research topic.
•

Over-the-phone interviews will be conducted with DLA and USAID personnel.
Interviewees per DLA and USAID POCs will include headquarter leadership
personnel. Interviewees will provide informed consent (see Appendix C).
Interviews will be recorded (only with interviewee’s permission), and transcribed
for analysis purposes, and information from interviews will be aggregated and
kept confidential.

•

Researcher will also document any noteworthy information during interviews.

4. Preparation prior to fieldwork
•

Researcher will conduct a self-assessment of skills and abilities to maintain the
following efforts:

•

Asking good questions – and interpreting the answers fairly

•

Being a good listener – and not trapped by existing ideologies or preconceptions

•

Staying adaptive – so that newly encountered situations are seen as opportunities,
not threats

•

Have a firm grasp of the issues being studied – even when in exploratory mode

•

Avoiding biases – by being sensitive to contrary evidence and conducting
research ethically (Yin, 2014).

•

Researcher will review the following prior to fieldwork: research proposal; case
study protocol; key readings (referenced above); key archival documents; and
interview protocols.
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•

Researcher will establish contact with designated DLA/USAID point of contact to
set up initial interviews.

Data Collection Questions (to guide researcher efforts and avoid mission creep; these are
not interview questions)

1. Core Considerations
a. Attempt to see DLA/USAID from the perspective of the interviewee upon
learning their responsibilities and expectations they are required to
meet/authorities they must report to.
b. How do these interagency relationships develop and mature over time? Are they
indeed progressing from cooperation to coordination to collaboration?
c. A lot of activity/communication between both agencies transpired in order to get
the MOU to the place it is now. How did that process work?
d. What are the driving forces behind these relationships? What are the barriers to
these relationships?

2. Implementation
a. Have any agreed upon activities/initiatives been incorporated into the regular
routines/governance structures of either organization?
b. How does the MOU truly characterize the relationship?
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c. There's a difference between carrying out specific tasks because they are written
down and we are forced to do them, and forecasting (or anticipating) requirements
for a customer before they need help.

3. Interview Quality and Validation
a. The majority of data collected are interviews. This will provide several
advantages as the force of the interview is it’s privileged access to the subject’s
everyday world (Kvale, 2007).
b. Each interview participant will add their own subjective interpretation of the
agencies’ strengths, weaknesses, goals, problems, etc, which will contribute to
each agency’s understanding of the other.
c. Commonalities in facing the same struggles brings a distinct awareness level that
may or may not have been present in the past and sharing this information may
allow for a united front in resolving current apprehension.
d. Controlled use of leading questions can lead to knowledge and the plurality of
interpretations enriches the meanings of each agencies’ world view (Kvale, 2007).
e. Generalization becomes possible with the transfer of knowledge gained between
leadership personnel at USAID and DLA.
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Code Definitions

1. Building Trust: Activities or behaviors that constitute building trust can begin with the
establishment of bilateral or interpersonal relationships, working on projects where
consensus must be reached, or operational cooperation across engagements. Trust is the
expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfill obligations, will behave in a particular
manner, and will act/negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present
(Zaheer et al., 1998).

2. Generating Value: The necessary question to ask is, ‘Despite the many organizational,
governmental, and cultural challenges each agency faces, do they provide value to their
respective members?’ The members of each agency must see the value acquired from
working together and that it outweighs any discordancy. Did DLA or USAID provide
what no other organization could? Members need to see the other agency as fulfilling an
important role that they cannot fill as effectively by themselves.

3. Cooperation: Usually manifests as a primarily verbal dialogue and takes place in
informal settings. One organization can present a need that the organization could satisfy
without a formal contract or agreement (Hord, 1986). Cooperation activities can be
considered transactional in nature and generally do not interfere with autonomous
programs of the participants, hence there are no risks or loss of independence with this
kind of communication (Mattesich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
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4. Coordination: Is more formal than cooperation. It can be considered as a step toward
further and more enhanced cooperation. It takes place when the organizations find that
their individual goals are similar, so they can work together on their, ‘separate, yet
compatible missions’ (Czajkowski, 2007). The organizations would be more involved in
the planning of activities and there are more risks associated because they commit
resources toward a common goal. Most coordination efforts do not alter the individual
organization authority, but it involves a form of central power that can add complexity to
the decision-making process (Mattesich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).

5. Collaboration: Takes place when organizations share authority and responsibility for
planning and implementing an action to solve a problem. Stakeholders engage in an
interactive process, using shared norms, rules, and structures, to act or decide on issues
related to that domain. (Wood & Gray, 1991). Basically, collaboration is working
alongside the other organization on the same task (Hveinden, 1994).

6. Cultural Differences: Contrasting views on methods of accomplishing tasks; why one
organization will do something one way, and the other will do that same thing a
completely different way. They are bound by different legislative and political directives,
they work for different government entities, and they each speak a different ‘language’.

7. Legislative Barriers: Each agency is bound under different statutory regulations and/or
directives. Additionally, different funding authorities are accompanied with their own
timelines and rules on expenditure. DoD Directive 5100.46 Foreign Disaster Relief is one
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of the main directives DoD and DLA must adhere to, moreover, they are bound by the
Berry Amendment of US Code Title 10, section 2533a, which dictates they give
procurement preference to domestically manufactured/produced products.
USAID/OFDA’s responsibilities and authority are explained in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as well as USAID’s Automated Directives System 251 and Foreign Affairs
Manual.

8. Funding Limitations: This was a ‘sub-code’ under Legislative Barriers due to the fact that
often times they each go hand-in-hand. The myriad of funding limitations often times
restricts both agencies as to what types of items can be procured and when they can be
procured. These financial rules also come with their own set of allocation, expenditure,
tracking, and reporting mechanisms that must be followed by each agency.

9. DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value: With C3 as an
abbreviation for ‘Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration’, this code is used to
capture DLA’s attempts to further develop these five concepts with USAID/OFDA. The
primary notion this code was meant to track was the number of times DLA was the
initiating agency and demonstrated proactive instigation of development of their
relationship with USAID/OFDA.

10. USAID Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value: Conversely, this code
was used to grasp the number of instances where USAID/OFDA was the initiating
agency in reaching out to DLA to develop the 5 concepts and build on their relationship.
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11. DLA Attempts to Acquire USAID’s ‘Playbook’: This code captured data that entailed
instances where DLA inquired with USAID/OFDA to become informed on the
operational plan for a particular HA/DR effort. These requests were generally for
detailed information to assist DLA in accomplishing the desired outcomes of
USAID/OFDA but unfortunately, were many times left unanswered or were delayed in
reaching DLA.

12. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): This code was used to categorize segments of data
that had anything to do with the MOA currently underway with both agencies. The intent
behind using this code to was examine whether either agency relied on the MOA’s
approval to be the ‘one-off’ solution to their inter-agency collaboration, or if they were
merely working on its finalization and referencing it for future interactions.

13. USAID Managing Funds: This code was developed in order to capture reoccurring
instances where DLA, or even internal employees of USAID/OFDA, saw USAID/OFDA
as ‘money managers’ and this being their primary function in the majority of HA/DR
relief efforts. Many personnel believe USAID/OFDA to be more of a contractor that
employs other agencies to conduct the supply chain responsibilities of HA/DR efforts,
rather than be responsible for them themselves.

14. USAID Restricting the Amount of Information Shared: This relates back to DLA
Attempting to Acquire USAID’s Playbook, in that this code was used to describe any
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segment of data that indicated that USAID was withholding certain pieces of desired
information from other agencies, not just from DLA. But whether this action was
occurring intentionally, or because USAID truly didn’t have the desired details on
operational planning efforts, is still to be determined. Either way, it places DLA in a very
reactive posture versus proactive.

15. DLA Giving USAID Credit: This code was used to capture the examples where DLA
exhibited recognition of the fact that they are not always the ‘best’ fit for support in
certain HA/DR operations. It was also used to describe data where DLA would comment
on USAID/OFDA’s strengths and core competencies of being the country experts and
understanding the suitable, cultural accommodations that have to be made under each
circumstance.
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Appendix B: DLA and USAID Interview Scripts

DLA Interview Script

1) Talk to me about what you do here at DLA. What are your roles?
2) Have you ever worked with USAID in the past?

3) Talk to me about your experiences with USAID…
a. What were some of the successes and challenges you experienced while working with
them during HA/DR operations? Can you give examples of both?

b. What are some of the lessons learned from those experiences?

4)

In your opinion, what current initiatives or activities exist to help improve communication
with USAID?

5)

From your experience, are there any redundancies or overlap in tasks or responsibilities
between DLA and USAID?

a. Can you provide an example relevant to a specific HA/DR operation?

6)

In your opinion, what are some of the main barriers to working with USAID?

a. How have these barriers affected DLA’s performance while working HA/DR tasks?
7)

How do you initially react when you discover that your organization will be working a HA/DR
operation with USAID?
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a. What do you think most influences your attitude toward USAID?

8)

In a perfect world, what pieces of information are a “must-have” in order to carry out your
taskings to fill orders/requests placed by USAID?

a. What are the timelines you would like to receive them in?

b. What could you do (if anything) to improve the information quality, accuracy, or
timeliness of the information transfer?
9)

What advantages do you think USAID brings to DLA’s ability to carry out HA/DR
operations?

10)

In your opinion, describe how the relationship between DLA and USAID should look in
the future when conducting HA/DR operations…

11) Is there anything else you think I should know to understand the interactions and
relationship between DLA and USAID?

12) Do you have any questions for me?

USAID Interview Script

1) Talk to me about what you do here at USAID. What are your roles?
2) Have you ever worked with DLA in the past?

3) Talk to me about your experiences with DLA…
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a.

What were some of the successes and challenges you experienced while working
with them during HA/DR operations? Can you give examples of both?

b.

What are some of the lessons learned from those experiences?

4)

In your opinion, what current initiatives or activities exist to help improve communication
with DLA?

5)

From your experience, are there any redundancies or overlap in tasks or responsibilities
between DLA and USAID?

a.

6)

In your opinion, what are some of the main barriers to working with DLA?

a.

7)

Can you provide an example relevant to a specific HA/DR operation?

How have these barriers affected USAID’s performance while working HA/DR
tasks?

How do you initially react when told your organization will be working a HA/DR operation with
DLA?

a. What do you think most influences your attitude toward DLA?

8)

In a perfect world, what pieces of information are a “must-have” from DLA in order to carry
out your taskings to fill orders/requests placed by your customers?

a. What are the timelines you would like to receive them in?
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b. What could you do (if anything) to improve the information quality, accuracy, or
timeliness of the information transfer?
9)

What advantages do you think DLA brings to USAID’s ability to carry out HA/DR
operations?

10)

In your opinion, describe how the relationship between USAID and DLA should look in
the future when conducting HA/DR operations…

11) Is there anything else you think I should know to understand the interactions and
relationship between DLA and USAID?

12) Do you have any questions for me?

List of Archival Documents

•

Defense Logistics Agency Whole of Government Strategy PowerPoint Presentation

•

Role of DoD in Foreign Disaster Relief from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Stabilization and Humanitarian Affairs

•

Missions/Functions Listing of DLA’s J3 and Regional Commands

•

Syrian Refugee Crisis After Action Report PowerPoint Presentation

•

Sphere Project Handbook

•

MITAM 18 (SBU)

•

Berry Amendment FAQ/General Information Webpage

•

Email Correspondence Accompanying MITAM 18 (SBU)

•

Memorandum for Executive Secretary Department of Defense from US Department
of State (SBU)

•

Lessons Learned from Syrian Refugee Crisis
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•

Email Coordination on Syrian Refugee Crisis AAR Development

•

USAID’s OFDA Fiscal Year 2018 Webpage

•

Adaptive Logistics Network Guides USARAF Operations Article Webpage

•

Humanitarian Civ-Mil Coordination (UN-CM Coord) on United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) Webpage

•

Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 14-028 DLA’s Support to Defense Support of
Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) Operations

•

DLA Public Affairs Article: DLA Division Uses Parachutes, Partnership to Support
Humanitarian Aid (April 4, 2017)

•

DLA Public Affairs Article: DLA Energy Supports Relief Efforts in Nepal (May 15,
2015)

•

USAID/OFDA Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response 2014 Action Cable FY
2014 (JHOC 2014)

•

USAID/OFDA Quick Reference Guide (JHOC 2014)
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Appendix C: Background Provision & Informed Consent Procedures

TALKING PAPER
ON
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION BETWEEN DLA AND USAID

- The purpose of this talking paper is to introduce a Defense Logistics Agency sponsored
research study being conducted by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). The purpose of
the study is to uncover ways to improve interagency coordination and decision quality for two
agencies: The Defense Logistics Agency, (DLA) and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, (USAID). The best practices revealed from this study will help each agency to
overcome communication barriers and improve their inter-organizational communication during
both normal operations and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts.

- Issue / Research Problem Statement

-- DLA is able to support and render aid to HA/DR missions around the world when called
upon by the U.S. Department of State. With various successful support operations executed in
the past, DLA has since codified their policies and instructions to help establish common
objectives and procedures for other support agencies as well as DLA itself. However, despite a
foundation of reliability DLA has established with many of their customers and strategic
partners, not all of their inter-organizational relationships are fully developed.
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-- USAID is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of State and the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance is responsible as the lead agency for foreign HA/DR operations. As each
agency plays a large role in the success of various HA/DR efforts, it is pivotal to uphold and
improve upon their relationship. They each have an impact on saving lives and alleviating
suffering brought on by natural disasters, which is a large responsibility for any one
organization to carry out alone.

- Research Objectives

-- Uncover how DLA can enhance their overall interagency coordination with USAID so that
it improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations.

-- Determine how to overcome collaboration barriers between both agencies

- Research Methodology

-- Examination of both DLA’s and USAID’s internal governing mechanisms and HA/DR
procedures

-- Semi-structured interviews with leadership of both agencies

- Points of Contact
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-- Principal Investigator, Col Matthew A. Douglas, Dean of Students, AFIT, Department of
Operational Sciences

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION BETWEEN DLA AND USAID RESEARCH

You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by researchers from the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management,
Department of Operational Sciences. The main objective of the project is to understand the
current level of interagency coordination between DLA and USAID, and see if there are any
methods by which to improve their collaboration. The results of this study will be included in a
report and briefing distributed to DLA, USAID, and the AFIT Department of Operational
Sciences. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your knowledge
and experience within DLA/USAID regarding HA/DR operations. You should read the
information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand before deciding
whether or not to participate.

-

This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop
the interview at any time or for any reason. I expect that the interview will take 30-60
minutes.
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-

You will not be compensated for this interview.

-

The information you tell us will be kept confidential.

-

I would like to record this interview so that I can transcribe it and use it for analysis as
part of this study. I will not record this interview without your permission. If you grant
permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke permission
and/or end the interview at any time.

-

Data collection for this project will be completed by December of 2017. All interview
documents will be securely stored.

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

(Please initial)
[

] I give permission for this interview to be recorded and transcribed.

Name of Subject:
Signature of Subject ____________________________
Signature of Investigator _____________

_________ Date ___
__________Date _______
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Please contact Col Matthew A. Douglas with any questions or concerns at
matthew.douglas@afit.edu or 937-255-3636 x4740.
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